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Evaluating
Environmental
Degradation as a
Cause of Burma’s
Rohingya Crisis
HELENA S. LONG

Abstract
Over the course of the past decade,
persecution against the Rohingya ethnic
group in Western Burma has escalated to the
point of genocide. Since August 2017 alone,
more than 730,000 Rohingya have fled their
homes in Rakhine State to neighboring
Bangladesh1. Previous studies on the causes
of this crisis have focused on the colonial
legacy of discrimination toward ethnic and
religious minorities in Burma, themes of
identity and citizenship, and role of social
media in fueling the violence. Over, this
paper will consider what may be an
overlooked factor: the role of environmental
stress in inciting the conflict. After outlining
commonly understood causes of the crisis,
this paper seeks to evaluate the extent to
which environmental stress factored in by
(1) examining the status of environmental
degradation and natural disasters in Burma,
(2) considering how environmental pressure
may exacerbate violence against the
Rohingya, and (3) comparing this crisis to
ethnic conflict in Sudan, where
environmental stress was undoubtedly a
cause of violence. By establishing where
and how environmental stress played into
the Rohingya crisis, recommendations to
reduce the likelihood of environmental
factors inciting similar conflicts can be
made.

Introduction
Over the course of the past decade,
persecution against the Rohingya ethnic
group in Western Burma has escalated to the
point of genocide, with the United Nations
Human Rights Council finding genocidal
intent in a 2019 factfinding mission2 and a
trial in the International Court of Justice
ongoing.3 Since August 2017 alone, more
than 730,000 Rohingya have fled their
homes in Rakhine State to neighboring
Bangladesh4. Previous analysis on the
causes of this crisis have focused on the
colonial legacy of discrimination toward
ethnic and religious minorities in Burma,5
themes of identity and citizenship,6
consequences of the 2011 democratic
opening including the emergence of
Buddhist extremist groups,7 and the
contribution of social media in escalating
violence.8 However, this paper considers
what may be an overlooked factor: the
impact of environmental stress. After
outlining historical context and the
commonly understood causes of the crisis,
this paper evaluates the extent to which
environmental stress played a causal role by
(1) examining the status of environmental
degradation and natural disasters in
Burma, (2) considering the relationship
between the environment and violence, and
(3) comparing this crisis to ethnic conflict in
Sudan, a frequently cited eco-conflict. After
establishing where and how environmental
stress is related to the Rohingya crisis,
policy recommendations for lessening this
factor’s role in Burma—as well as in other
conflict regions— are offered and assessed.

Background and Historical Context
Burma, also known as Myanmar, is a
country of approximately 55,600,000 people
located in Southeast Asia (see Figure 1for
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map) with an extremely ethnically diverse
population; the most populous ethnic groups
are Burman (68%), Shan (9%), Karen (7%),
Rakhine (4%), Chinese (3%), Indian (2%),
and Mon (2%).9 For most of the region’s
history, various ethnic groups maintained
independent city-states and kingdoms, but in
the 19th century, Britain conquered Burma
and incorporated it as a province of the
Indian Empire.10 In 1937, Britain began
administering Burma as a separate, selfgoverning colony, and in 1948 it gained
independence.11

Figure 1: Map of Burma administrative
districts12
From independence until recently,
Burma has been governed by a series of
right-wing military and one-party regimes. 13
In 1989, following a year of violent unrest, a
new ruling junta changed the country’s
name from Burma to Myanmar, although
many countries including the United States
still do not recognize the name change due
to the illegitimacy of the government that
made the decision.14 In the 1990 election,
the National League for Democracy, a prodemocracy party led by Aung San Suu Kyi,
won a landslide victory, but the junta
refused to hand over power and Suu Kyi was

placed under house arrest.15 In 1991, Suu
Kyi gained international recognition when
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize while still
under house arrest; in total, she would spend
15 of the next 21 years under house arrest
and was most recently detained in February
2021 during the country’s latest coup.16
Following the 1990 elections,
General Than Shwe became the paramount
ruler of the country for almost two decades
until the 2011 general elections, when the
military junta was officially dissolved.17 In
the wake of this democratic opening,
President Barack Obama became the first
U.S. president to visit Burma in 2012,
meeting with Suu Kyi, who had been
released from house arrest and elected to the
national legislature.18 President Obama
commended her as a champion of
democracy and human rights, thus launching
Burma’s progress into the international
spotlight.19 In 2015, the first credible
election in decades was held, with the NLD
emerging with an overwhelming victory and
Suu Kyi becoming the de facto head of
state.20
Reforms over the past decade were
marred by the continuing control of the
military (also known as the Tatmadaw) in
daily and political life and proven to be
short-lived in the aftermath of the latest
coup.21 The current Commander in Chief,
Min Aung Hlaing, was recommended for
investigation into crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and genocide by the UNHRC in
201922 and assumed all state power after
leading the Tatmadaw in arresting Suu Kyi
and other senior NLD leaders in February
2021.23
The 2019 investigation into Aung
Hlaing primarily regarded the intense
violence against the Rohingya people on the
western edge of Burma.24 The government
of Burma recognizes 135 “national races” in
Burma based on a list compiled in 1962.25
The Rohingya—all 2.5 million of them—are
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not one of these, constituting the world’s
largest stateless population, meaning they
are not citizens of any country.26 In fact,
most Burmese (including Suu Kyi) do not
even use the word “Rohingya,” rather, they
consider the group to be illegal immigrants
from Bangladesh.27 The exact origins of the
Rohingya are not known, but there is
evidence that this group has been present in
the region since the 13th century.28 The
Rohingya are not the only Muslims in
Burma—about 4% of the population is
Muslim, compared to more than two-thirds
who are Buddhist.29 However, Rohingya are
distinct from other Muslims in the country,
living in rural areas of the country’s Rakhine
State, speaking a dialect of Bengali, and
having Muslim rather than Burmese
names.30
There have long been divisions
between the Rohingya and other ethnic
groups in Burma. During WWII, the
Rohingya, along with the Karen and Kachin
minority groups, sided with the Allies and
engaged in guerilla warfare while the
Burmans sided with the Japanese.31
Following independence in 1948, the
Rohingya were gradually excluded from
state institutions. In 1974, the Rohingya
were labelled foreign citizens and mandated
to carry registration cards to distinguish
them from Burmans.32 The 1982 Citizenship
Law then effectively rendered the Rohingya
stateless by requiring all citizens to either
(1) be a member of the 135 national races,
(2) have a pending application under the
1948 Union Citizenship Act, or (3) have
conclusive evidence of residence in Burma
before independence.33 The political
upheaval around 1990 further worsened
conditions for the Rohingya: a campaign
against Muslims was seen as strengthening
the military government’s national
credentials among Buddhists.34 Nearly
300,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh in the
early 1990s, claiming the military forced

them from their homes,35 and the Tatmadaw
restricted the population’s movement within
Rakhine state.36 In 1995, the UNHCR
pressured Burma into providing “Temporary
Registration Cards” to the Rohingya, but
violence continued past the turn of the
century with attacks on Muslim schools and
places of worship.37 In 2005, a two-child
policy was introduced in Rakhine State,
solely for the Rohingya population.38
Violence worsened after the
democratic opening of 2011.39 In June 2012,
the alleged rape and murder of a Rakhine
woman by three Muslim youths incited a
killing spree.40 The Rakhine are the largest
ethnic group in Rakhine state, and are
predominately Buddhist; in 2009, insurgents
formed the Arakan Army seeking selfdetermination for the Rakhine people,
adding another complicated dimension to
the conflict as the army clashes with both
the Tatmadaw and Rohingya.41 The violence
in 2012 between Rakhine and Rohingya
communities left at least 100 people dead
and left thousands of buildings including
homes, mosques, monasteries, and schools
burned down.42
2015 is generally considered the start
of the Rohingya refugee crisis, as increasing
“ghettoization, sporadic massacres, and
restrictions on movement” of the Rohingya
caused thousands to flee on rickety boats to
other Southeast Asian countries.43 In 2017,
the Tatmadaw began a “clearance
operation,” which included “extra judicial
killings, gang rapes, arson—all argued to
constitute genocide, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity.”44 Some 700,000
Rohingya fled Burma to refugee camps in
Bangladesh, leaving just about 200,000
Rohingya in Rakhine State by October
2018.45 In 2019, Burmese authorities
claimed the Rohingya could return, and
began operating “reception centers” near the
border, but these centers are often empty due
to the displaced people’s deep distrust that
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they will return to safe conditions.46
Findings from the 2019 UNHRC factfinding
mission found that although “clearance
operations” on the scale of 2017 ceased, “the
Rohingya remain the target of a Government
attack aimed at erasing the identity and
removing them from Myanmar...With
another year having passed without
improvements to their dire living conditions,
prospects for accountability or legal
recognition as citizens of Myanmar, their
plight can only be considered as having
deteriorated.”47

investigated the Tatmadaw for violence
against groups including the Shan, Kachin,
Karen, and Chin53 (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Image by Author In 2018, I briefly visited the
city of Tachileik in Burma’s Shan State while studying abroad in
Thailand. The Shan battle for independence is another example of

Established Causes of the Conflict
Most existing scholarship on the causes of
the Rohingya crisis focuses on the long
history of ethnic conflict and discrimination
in Burma. Jobair Alam argues that this
discrimination is rooted in the British
colonial era, stating that before the arrival of
the British, “the different groups that make
up the complex ethnic tapestry of Burma
were never under the authority of a single
government.”48 The British era created the
majority-minority divide and deep
nationalism tied to Buddhist identity that
exists to this day.49 After independence,
discrimination was solidified into laws such
as the 1982 Citizenship Law which rendered
the Rohingya stateless and deprived them of
access to education, health services, and
employment.50 This stripping of citizenship
“largely (re)shaped the identity of the
Rohingya in Myanmar as a non-Burman
Muslim religious minority,” compared to
minorities who “strictly comply with and fit
absolutely in the Burmese-constructed
ideals, belief and identity.”51 Even
disregarding acts of violence against the
Rohingya, their rejection from the state has
led to restrictions on travel, marriage,
birthing rates, and freedom of religion.52 The
Rohingya are not the only minority group to
face discrimination in Burma; the UN has

ethnic conflict in Burma.

However, while there are multiple
ethnic conflicts ongoing in Burma, the
campaign against the Rohingya has been the
most systematic.54 A 1988 regime document
recently uncovered by the International State
Crime Institute exposed a long term plan for
eradication of the Rohingya, with steps
including forbidding land ownership and
finding the Rohingya at fault in all court
cases—but avoiding mass killing “in order
not to invite the attention of the Muslim
countries.”55 This document embodies one
of the main established causes of the current
crisis: discrimination against the Rohingya
is deeply rooted in laws and practices under
the military regime, and the Tatmadaw has
simply been waiting for an excuse “to totally
wipe them out from Rakhine.”56 The extent
to which the ethnic conflict is civilian as
well as military based is debated; for
example, there is deep animosity between
Rakhine and Rohingya locals, but at least
part of this resentment may be attributed to
manipulation by the Tatmadaw in turning
the groups against each other.57
Beyond ethnic discrimination,
religious discrimination is pertinent to this
crisis. Islamophobia is common among
many Burmese Buddhists, and Rakhine
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state’s location bordering Muslim
Bangladesh makes some consider it the
“‘western gate’... the last line of defence
protecting the pure, Theravadda Buddhism”
of Burma from Islam.58 Some Buddhists
hold the view that, “If the gate breaks, the
tens of millions of Muslims from Bengal
will overrun not only Myanmar but also
mainland Southeast Asia, much as is
narrated to have occurred centuries ago in
island Southeast Asia.”59
Nobody disputes that a long history
of ethnic and religious discrimination
against the Rohingya underlies the latest
violent campaign against them. What is less
certain however, is the specific events that
triggered the unprecedented bloodshed of
the past decade. Waves of violence have hit
Rakhine State before, but recent years are
distinct in their display of “undeterred
propagation of hate speech coupled with
clear political coordination.”60 One theory is
that the democratic reopening triggered the
violence. The most recent Constitution,
written in 2008, “is notable for the degree to
which it has not only conjoined the state and
national races lexically but also
institutionally.”61 The Constitution
emphasized the idea of “taingyintha,” or
“national races” of Burma, and suggested
that belonging to one of the recognized races
was of even greater importance than
citizenship.62 The Constitution frames
taingyintha as creating a “mythic unity that
has never emerged and could be read as a
defiant repudiation of ethnic diversity.”63
In addition to constitutional changes,
when the military junta lifted limits on free
expression and assembly in 2011, it allowed
for a wave of populist mobilization where
“deep, pent-up societal division and hatred,
which was repressed by authoritarian rule”
was unleashed by the democratization
process.64 Two Buddhist extremist groups
emerged in the aftermath of the 2011
transition: the “969 Movement” and “Ma-

Ba-Tha,” both of which have been tolerated
and even promoted by the government.65
Many westerners consider Buddhism a
pacifist religion; however, certain monks are
at the forefront of the violence. For example,
U Wirathu, the monk leader of the 969
movement, was called the “Face of Buddhist
Terror” by Time magazine in 2013.66 These
extremist groups successfully campaigned
the government to revoke the Rohingya’s
temporary registration certificates in 2015
and have spewed hate speech, including
calling Islam “a faith of animals with
uncontrollable birthrates."67 Additionally,
fearmongering and discrimination have
become campaign tools in the era of
democracy, and both “hardliners and socalled reformists find incentives in being
complicit in the anti-Muslim conflicts.”68
Thus, while democratic developments in
Burma over the past decade promised
reform from the years of junta control, they
may in fact have helped incite the conflict in
Rakhine State by releasing “hard-core and
deeply felt grievances about Buddhism
being under siege from the forces of
modernity, globalism and Islam.”69
A final factor commonly cited as
amplifying the violence is the use of social
media in Burma. In Burma, Facebook is so
widely used by the country’s 18 million
internet users that it is often equated with the
internet itself.70 In 2018, a New York Times
investigation revealed that not only were
extremist groups using Facebook to disperse
hate speech, but the military itself was
behind turning “the social network into a
tool for ethnic cleansing.”71 Military
personnel created fake accounts and flooded
them with hate speech, including posting
pictures of corpses they said were evidence
of massacres by the Rohingya, and stated
that Muslim attacks were imminent.72
Facebook took down accounts after the
investigation revealed ties to the military but
received criticism for its response and
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commitment to preventing similar situations
in the future.73 The internet provides a
means of propaganda beyond anything in the
past, and the systematic use of it by
extremists and the military to instigate
violence contributed to the crisis’ outbreak
and intensity.

Environmental Factors in Burma
With an understanding of the prevailing
causal theories, environmental factors in
Burma can be discussed. The environment
has long been studied as a “threat
multiplier” for existing conflicts.74 Thomas
F. Homer-Dixon writes that environmental
scarcity “can contribute to civil violence,
including insurgencies and ethnic clashes.”75
However, its role is rarely direct, rather
interacting with other factors to produce
violence, and therefore analysts often
overlook scarcity’s role in flaring underlying
stress and instead interpret economic, social,
or political factors as the principal cause.76
An example of interaction between social
and environmental factors is “resource
capture,” when dominant groups within a
society “shift resource distribution in their
favor.” 77 Moreover, environmental scarcity
may strengthen group identities based on
ethnic, class, or religious affiliations in a
process known as social segmentation, as
groups face intensified competitive for
resources.78
While the role of resource scarcity in
conflict is far from new, climate change,
population growth, and economic
development are expected to increase the
prevalence of these circumstances.79
Through catastrophic weather events,
climate change, “will lead to new or more
intense resource scarcities, which, in turn,
will trigger more intense competition and
conflict between states and local
communities sharing common resources.”80

This existing framework for the role
of environmental scarcity and natural
disasters in fueling conflict evokes the
situation in Burma, which faces an
increasingly vulnerable environmental state.
A 2019 World Bank report concluded that
Burma’s ecosystems, fisheries, and forestry
are under “tremendous pressure.”81 Burma’s
marine fish resources have declined as much
as 90 percent since 1980, forest cover has
declined by 10 million hectares since 1990,
and urban waste, mining discharge, and air
quality are all deteriorating as well.82
As Burma relies heavily on natural
resource exploitation for economic
development, environmental degradation
affects not only the natural world and human
health, but economic prosperity. Seventy
percent of the labor force is employed in
agriculture, accounting for 37.8 percent of
GDP.83 The government has prioritized
short-term profit over long-term
sustainability, with slash-and-burn and
industrial agriculture methods promoted.84
Burma’s policies hostile to sustainable
changes “can force the cultivation systems
into suboptimal practices … or obstruct
them altogether, leading to poverty and
conflict, alienating cultivators and leading to
degraded land.” 85 Climate change will
compound this threat, with the FAO finding
that Burma is “highly vulnerable to climate
change and extreme weather conditions,”
with significant risk for agricultural
production and food insecurity. 86 The FAO
and World Bank call for sustainable policy
approaches to prevent a worse-case scenario.
Unfortunately, a different kind of
worse-case scenario is already facing
Rakhine State. Rakhine State is one of the
most resource-rich parts of the country,
despite being one of the poorest
economically.87 However, recent efforts aim
to tap into the region’s potential. For
example, between 2000 and 2014, Rakhine
state lost more mangrove forest cover than
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any other state in Burma, causing an
estimated ecosystem value loss of $946.87
million per year due to damages to fisheries
and habitat.88 When resource-rich Rakhine
state is contrasted to conditions in Burma’s
central states, where the populous regions of
Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing display
existing land degradation due to problems
with erosion, desertification, salinization,
and deforestation,89 the question is raised:
does the recent exploitation of Rakhine
state’s resources constitute a “resource
capture” scenario as conditions deteriorate
in primarily Burman states?
Burma’s “Agenda 21” plan for
sustainable development, a document
submitted to the U.N., even hints at this
intention. In it, programs for “the
development of border areas and national
races” and reclaiming “cultivable
wastelands” are described.90 This reference
to taingyintha is alarming within a
sustainable development plan, and the plan
may be coming to fruition. In the midst of
the Rohingya crisis, the government
announced that Rakhine state would be
transformed into a business hub, and
countries including Japan and Korea have
already invested in the state.91 A.K.M Ahsan
Ullah and Diotima Chattoraj claim that to
implement this development plan, “the
government needed to wipe out Rohingya
from their homeland.”
New York Times reporters in Rakhine
state in 2019 witnessed this development in
action.92 The reporters noted “infrastructure
development in Rakhine: new power
stations, government buildings and, most of
all, military and border guard bases ... built
on land emptied by ethnic cleansing,” and
found that Buddhists had taken over
Rohingya businesses, that the military
continues to raze Muslim villages, and that
the companies responsible for the building
boom were “cronies of the military.” 93

Rakhine state is not the only ethnic
minority state in Burma where resources
have been seized by the Tatmadaw. For
example, in Kachin state, “resource
extraction has provided incentive and
financing” for the Tatmadaw and the Kachin
Independence Organization (KIO) to keep
fighting in a state rich with precious stones
and minerals.94 In Karen state, the
Tatmadaw has used “intimidation and
coercion to seize land and displace local
people” in an area that is appealing for
tourism, extractive, and agriculture
industries.95
If the Tatmadaw are similarly
pursuing resource gains in Rakhine state,
who stands to benefit? While the
government was known to enlist “Rakhine
Buddhist fundamentalists to safeguard their
interests in the resource-rich state,”96 the
Tatmadaw’s own ongoing conflict with the
Arakan Army calls to attention that in other
ethnic regions facing conflict in Burma,
“armed groups have often been manipulated
against each other, weakening their military
capabilities, and often causing them to lose
control of their natural resources.”97 This
raises the possibility that both ethnic
minorities, Rohingya and Rakhine, could be
excluded from any Tatmadaw development
plan in favor of enriching the military’s own
pockets or benefitting solely the Burman
majority.
In addition to this development plan,
specific environmental events may have
fueled the crisis; in particular, the aftermath
of Cyclone Nargis had secondary effects on
the Rakhine region. On May 2, 2008,
Cyclone Nargis struck Burma’s Irrawaddy
Delta, located primarily in Ayeyarwady
Region bordering Rakhine State.98
Approximately 140,000 people were killed,
making it the worst natural disaster in
Burmese history.99 The cyclone additionally
destroyed much of Burma’s rice crop, as the
Irrawaddy Delta was one of the primary
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regions of production, and saline water from
storm surge contaminated about one million
acres of cropland.100 This caused severe
food shortages and high prices, with one
analyst predicting that due to “the historical
connection between rice shortages and
popular unrest … the cycle of explosive
protest and regime crackdowns is likely to
continue.”101 While Cyclone Nargis is the
most severe example, other natural disasters
such as 2010’s Cyclone Giri and 2017’s
Cyclone Mora also worsened conditions.
Cyclone Giri destroyed an estimated 97, 125
hectares of farmland in Rakhine State,102
and Cyclone Mora—which hit the region
after the refugee crisis began—tore through
refugee camps. These natural disasters likely
had a destabilizing effect on the region and
intensified competition for resources.
The evidence in Burma of
environmental scarcity, resource capture in
ethnic regions, and devastating natural
disasters aligns with the existing framework
for how environmental stress may fuel
violence, particularly as a threat multiplier
on top of deep-rooted social and political
elements. To further explore this claim, this
crisis can be compared to another where
environmental factors are frequently cited as
playing a role: Sudan.

Comparative Case Study: Sudan
While the decades-long conflict in Sudan
(and now South Sudan) began as an ethnoreligious civil war between the
predominantly Arab Muslim north and the
African Christian south, the war has grown
in layers of complexity over the years, and
now environmental factors including
drought and desertification are commonly
recognized as exacerbating the violence.103
Sudan gained independence from Britain in
1956, and like many other postcolonial
states, Sudan was left with few routes to
economic development beyond its natural

resources.104 An overconcentration of people
in central Sudan led to severe degradation
and overexploitation of the region,
contributing “to intensifying ethnic
hostilities and competition for limited
resources.”105 Additionally, this motivated
the northern-based government to drive
southward to extract natural resources,
jeopardizing the livelihoods of southern
citizens and contributing to the formation of
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in
present-day South Sudan.106 While violence
in Sudan is still best characterized as an
ethno-religious conflict, “eco-conflicts have
clearly protracted the Sudanese war” as
advantaged groups monopolize resources at
the expense of the majority, resulting “in
environmental destruction, economic
decline, social disintegration, population
displacement, and protracted conflict.107
How well does Sudan’s situation
align with Burma’s? In both cases (see
Figure 3 for a comparative flowchart) a
former British colony with extreme ethnic
and religious diversity was left with few
tools for survival beyond natural resource
use. For both countries, this led to
overexploitation of resources in the
central/majority-group-controlled regions,
causing a drive for development in minority
regions. Finally, in Sudan and Burma, these
drives for development were followed by
waves of intense violence within a longer
history of conflict. However, there are some
differences. For one, environmental pressure
in Sudan is more severe, with a 2007 U.N.
Environmental Programme report declaring
that the scale of climate change was “almost
unprecedented: the reduction in rainfall has
turned millions of hectares of already
marginal semi-desert grazing land into
desert.”108 In comparison, Burma is in “a
region less vulnerable to desertification,”
although aforementioned issues including
soil erosion, salinization, soil fertility
depletion, and alkalinization affect about 17
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percent of the country, primarily in the
central regions.109 Another difference
between Sudan and Burma is the presence of
climate migration. In Sudan, drought,
desertification, and flooding are direct
causes of migration and internal
displacement, as these issues force people to
seek more arable land.110 In Burma, there is
little evidence that environmental factors
directly cause IDPs and climate refugees,
but environmental pressure may intensify
the conflicts that produce refugees. Finally,
the role of natural disasters is different in
these two countries: Burma is vulnerable to
unpredictable, one-time events such as
cyclones, earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic
eruptions, and landslides, whereas Sudan is
more vulnerable to long-term events such as
droughts.

Figure 3: Infographic by Author
The case of Sudan helps exemplify
how the Rohingya crisis fits the framework
of a conflict with environmental layers, even
if degradation in Burma is less severe than
Sudan. While there is limited prior research
on the role of environmental pressure in
Burmese conflicts, there are clear
similarities between Burma and Sudan
where more scholarship on eco-conflict
exists, thus displaying how a combination of
ethnic tensions, unequal distribution of
power, and resource scarcity fuels violence.

Environmental Impacts of the Crisis
Not only have environmental problems in
Burma seemingly contributed to the past
decade’s flare-up of violence against the
Rohingya, but the crisis itself has impacted
the environment. As of August 2019, more
than 730,000 Rohingya refugees are living
in the world’s largest refugee encampment
in Bangladesh, a “teeming, squalid
settlement” where landslides, rampaging
elephants, and disease are common.111
These camps put tremendous pressure on
local ecosystems. About 4,300 acres of hills
and forests were cut down to make shelters
and to use as cooking fuel, and every month
an additional nearly 6,800 tons of firewood
are collected.112 This deforestation causes
biodiversity loss and increases the risk of
landslides.113 Additionally, air quality is
declining as a result of increased vehicular
traffic and smoke from cooking fires, and
there are no long-term solutions for waste
management including fecal matter and
plastics.114 This has resulted in the
contamination of already-limited water
resources, with about 70 percent of
groundwater samples in a 2017 study found
to be heavily polluted.115 The poor
environmental outlook for areas around the
camps not only negatively impacts
ecosystems and creates even worse
conditions for the already suffering
Rohingya, but risks additional conflict. A
summary of physical impacts of the camps
in a U.N. Development Programme report
concluded that, “In particular the impacts on
groundwater may give rise to significant
social conflicts between the host
communities and Rohingya over the use of
water resources.”116
Analysis of Causes
Few, if any, conflicts are one-dimensional.
Conflicts consist of “numerous root causes
interacting or stimulating each other and
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finally escalating into the explosion …
conflict is a process, not a fixed state of
crisis.”117 In the case of Burma, the root
causes of the Rohingya crisis are ethnic
discrimination stemming from the British
colonial era and religious discrimination
intensified by the civilization “fault line”
between Burma and Bangladesh. These root
causes have resulted in systematic exclusion
of the Rohingya from Burmese society, with
a system of laws and policies denying them
citizenship and basic rights. With this long
history of exclusion, what factors incited the
recent phase of violence, which peaked in
2017? While prior scholarship primarily
cites societal changes caused by the 2011
democratic opening, the emergence of new
Buddhist extremist groups, and propaganda
efforts made possible by social media,
increasing environmental pressure in Burma
should be considered a factor as well.
In Burma, overreliance on natural
resources, unsustainable government
policies, and natural disasters including the
devastating Cyclone Nargis have contributed
to a situation of environmental stress, with
the country’s ecosystems, fisheries, and
forestry coming under tremendous
pressure.118 One sign of this stress is land
degradation in the populous central regions,
and there is evidence that the Tatmadaw’s
solution to securing resources (whether to
fund its own operations or for the majority
ethnic and religious groups) is to exploit
resource-rich ethnic minority states. For
instance, Burma’s Agenda 21 plan lists
development of border areas and national
races as a sustainable development
program,119 and resource capture is evident
within conflicts in both Karen120 and Kachin
States.121 That a similar seizure—rather than
pure ethnic conflict—is unfolding in
Rakhine state is evidenced by a recent
harvesting push in the region for resources
such as mangroves and an announcement by
the government after the “clearance

operations” of 2017 that Rakhine State
would be transformed into a business hub.122
This infrastructure development on land
cleared by ethnic cleansing, with Buddhists
moving in where the Rohingya were killed
or forced out, has been witnessed by
reporters in the region.123
Therefore, while violence against the
Rohingya is mired in deep ethnic and
religious division, codified in discriminatory
policies, and has been foreshadowed for
decades—most explicitly by a regime
document with a long-term eradication plan
for the Rohingya—environmental scarcity in
Burma fits the framework for eco-conflicts
as an “aggravating cause in a highly
complex, multicausal system.”124 The
environmental layer likely not only interacts
with the long-term causes of the crisis, but
also with other inciting factors. For example,
Homer-Dixon’s social segmentation process
of heightened group identity in the face of
resource competition may partially explain
the emergence of players within the conflict
such as Buddhist extremist groups or the
Arakan army. Additionally, in the wake of
the democratic opening, the Tatmadaw may
have sought ways to strengthen itself after
losing junta control, with lucrative foreign
contracts for infrastructure development in
ethnic regions a possible solution. And
further, the Rohingya crisis’ own
environmental impacts including degraded
land, water, and air in areas around the
refugee camps risk a circular effect of
starting new conflict with the host
community. These are examples of the ways
in which environmental factors may weave
throughout a conflict to inspire new points
of tension or exacerbate existing ones.
While “because the relationship between
environmental scarcity and contextual
factors is interactive, it is often impossible to
determine the relative weight or power of
environmental scarcity as a cause of
violence in specific cases,” the evidence in
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Burma leads to the conclusion that
environmental factors must be considered
within the dimensions of the Rohingya
crisis.

Recommendations
The Rohingya crisis is often called a
hopeless one. While in April 2018, Burma
agreed to begin “voluntary and dignified
repatriations,” almost no Rohingya have
returned.125 The Rohingya are terrified to
return to the site of mass killings, and
Burmese officials still fail to even recognize
them as a distinct ethnic group, much less
citizens.126 The September 2019 UNHRC
factfinding mission on Burma found that
there is a serious risk of genocidal actions
recurring, and that it is impossible for the
Rohingya to return in current conditions.127
Meanwhile, the Bangladeshi government,
struggling with overpopulation and poverty,
is under pressure from its citizens to ensure
that funds are not diverted to refugees, who
have not been given official refugee status to
ensure their placement is not permanent.128
General recommendations for
addressing this conflict include repealing the
1982 Citizenship Law and offering an
accessible path to citizenship for the
Rohingya.129 Additionally, Burma should
close its internal camps housing Rohingya
and provide them with adequate land and
freedom of movement.130 The UNHRC does
not recommend returning refugees located in
Bangladesh to Burma until adequate
provisions for their protection exist.131
International acts such as prosecuting Burma
for crimes against humanity, severing
relations between the international
community and the Tatmadaw, and
instituting sanctions to prevent the flow of
arms and other military equipment into the
country may pressure the government into
action. The UN factfinding mission on
Myanmar listed 14 known international

suppliers of arms to Burma, which included
companies based in China, Russia, India,
and Singapore (see figure 4 for a chart of
suppliers132). However, the practical
limitations of these recommendations must
be acknowledged, particularly in light of the
February 2021 coup when the Tatmadaw
regained control of the government. Despite
being alienated from much of the global
community and with genocide proceedings
ongoing in the International Court of Justice,
the Tatmadaw has only doubled down on
suppression—not just for ethnic minorities,
but all opposition.133 In a country where
officials still claim “‘Rohingya’ is not
real,”134 a better future within Burma’s
borders for the Rohingya seems far from
reality.

Figure 4: Infographic on arms and military
equipment suppliers to Burma
Recommendations specific to
environmental causes begin with addressing
the underlying degradation. As HomerDixon writes, “if severe environmental
damage becomes irreversible, it can become
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a permanent source of social stress; even if
the political and economic factors that
originally produced the damage are
fixed.”135 Between continued
overexploitation of resources, population
growth, and the accelerating threat of
climate change, Burma must take action
now to prevent permanent harm to the land
and resources its people depend upon for
survival. Actions such as restoring
productivity to land through sustainable
agriculture methods, diversifying crops,
combating illegal logging and poaching, and
improving urban conditions through waste
management and air pollution projects can
help improve Burma’s environmental status.
Additionally, Burma should move away
from a largely natural resource-based
economy as outlined in the country’s
Sustainable Development Plan. However,
development projects must benefit all
residents; specifically in Rakhine state,
development programs “should take the
necessary steps to ensure that their actions,
first, do not enrich the Tatmadaw and,
second, are of benefit to all the ethnic
communities of Rakhine State on the basis
of equality.”136 By addressing underlying
environmental degradation, curbing climate
change, and developing sustainably and
inclusively, environmental issues could
move far down the long list of factors
causing conflict in Burma. Additionally, to
prevent the degradation caused by refugee
camps from perhaps fueling more violence,
international aid should be directed to
refugees to supply resources such as
alternative fuel options and safe drinking
water. Whether in a Bangladeshi camp or in
the central regions of Burma, unmitigated
deterioration of environmental conditions
can only be expected to increase tensions in
the region, possibly leading to further social
segmentation, resource capture, and
violence.

Conclusion
In this paper, environmental degradation in
Burma has been examined as a factor in the
ongoing Rohingya crisis. While the root
causes of this conflict are long-term and
systematic ethnic and religious
discrimination, Burma’s declining
environmental status should be considered
alongside the fallout of the 2011 democratic
opening, a wave of Buddhist extremism, and
propaganda spread through social media as
an inciting factor. Limited prior research
exists on the Rohingya crisis as an ecoconflict; however, through examining the
location and extent of degradation and
natural disasters in Burma, the government’s
stated plans for development, and the
current situation in Rakhine State, a portrait
of the environmental layers of the crisis can
be painted. Additionally, the situation in
Burma can be placed within the existing
framework for the role of environmental
scarcity in ethno-religious conflicts, with the
Tatmadaw’s actions in ethnic regions of
Burma aligning with the concept of resource
capture and showing how competition may
contribute to social segmentation. Finally, a
comparative case-study to conflict in Sudan
sheds light on how while “environmental
stress results in violent conflict only when
interacting with other political, ethnic,
economic, and social causes,”137 (Lee,
1997), in both Burma and Sudan, resource
scarcity and inequality led to worsening
violence along existing fault lines. With few
signs that Burma will soon turn to more
sustainable resource use, and with climate
change certain to aggravate natural disasters
and land quality issues, action needs to be
taken now to prevent the intensification of
conflict in an already conflict-ridden
country. The situation of the Rohingya in
Burma provides further warning for other
countries facing upheaval in how
environmental stress may lace itself through
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fracture points—a warning that must be
heeded as environmental threats accelerate
and intensify worldwide.
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Neocolonial Discourse
in the Peace Corps:
Problematic
Implications for
Intercultural
Relationship-Building
NICOLE E. WOOD

Abstract
For those familiar with the field of
international development, the Peace Corps
has become a well-recognized source of
American aid, service, and intercultural
relationships. While many would call Peace
Corps service honorable, it is important to
recognize the agency’s roots in
neocolonialism. As I demonstrate in this
article, the Peace Corps was established so
that the United States could interfere in the
self-determination of foreign countries,
influence their development, and ensure the
creation of Western democratic and
capitalistic structures worldwide—all under
the guise of altruistic aid. My challenge for
the Peace Corps is the following: in order
for the agency to continue promoting the
peace, sustainable change, and intercultural
relationships it prides itself on, the Peace
Corps has to reckon with its intentionally
deceitful past, neocolonial structure, and
current position as a federal entity exerting
power in developing countries around the
world.

First, I provide some background
information about the Peace Corps, their
goals, and their model of service. Then, in
Section 2, I discuss the historical context of
the Peace Corps’ establishment and reveal
how colonial rhetoric was used to justify a
need for the agency. I do this by exploring
the “East vs. West” divide in development
discourse through an application of Edward
Said’s “Orientalism” theory. Next, I uncover
how notions of Western superiority
furthered neocolonialism by drawing upon
the concept of “positional superiority,”
which Michael Latham discusses in his book
Modernization as Ideology. In the fourth
section, I demonstrate how racist and
ethnocentric ideologies have shaped the
Peace Corps narrative.
In Section 5, I examine current Peace
Corps values by reviewing agency training
materials and the work of their Intercultural
Competency, Diversity and Inclusion
(ICD&I) Team. Here, I highlight how the
Peace Corps is promoting equitable
relationships through improved intercultural
training and from an application of
“postcolonial self-reflexivity”—a theory
covered by Jenna Hanchey, a returned Peace
Corps volunteer. Finally, I provide an
overall analysis of the agency, detailing
three negative aspects of its structure I
believe pose the biggest challenges, as the
issues pertain directly to neocolonial
development work, equitable partnerships
and intercultural relationships.
Ultimately, I argue no amount of
intercultural awareness, sensitivity training,
or integration measures can override the
“positional superiority” that the Peace Corps
benefits from as a U.S. government entity.
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Only when one considers the agency’s
neocolonial roots, their unwillingness to
change problematic aspects of their
structure, and the Eurocentric notion that is
“development”, can the problem be fully
realized. I argue true equity between the
Peace Corps and the countries it serves
cannot be attained until the agency separates
itself from the U.S. government, hires only
technically-skilled applicants, and begins
incorporating more host country national
leadership into their grassroots work.

volunteers to represent the United States and
American culture, and for volunteers to
learn about their host countries.2 This
mutual exchange of practices, norms and
values is an integral part of Peace Corps
service and the knowledge volunteers bring
back to the U.S. after their service is said to
benefit the whole U.S. population by
promoting a better understanding of cultures
around the world.2

Brief Peace Corps Overview

In order to understand why the Peace
Corps was created in 1961, one must
recognize the historical context of the Cold
War and the United States’ perspective
going into it. Following World War II,
communism in the Soviet Union posed the
next great danger to American society. This
intangible threat of communist ideology, and
the goal of ultimately containing it, became
the United States’ main concern leading into
the Cold War.
No president better exemplified anticommunist rhetoric and liberal “Western”
ideals than the young John F. Kennedy.
Upon being elected to office in 1961,
Kennedy put forth a comprehensive
containment plan to focus on periphery
regions around the Soviet Union, rather than
interfering directly with the superpower3.
The Kennedy Administration saw young,
emerging countries in “the East” as
opportunities for the United States to
suppress the spread of communism and
ensure the establishment of Western
political and economic structures in the
U.S.’ own image. Kennedy’s foreign policy
advisors believed that developing countries

Founded in 1961 by President John
F. Kennedy, the Peace Corps (PC) serves to
work alongside developing countries and
provide them with trained volunteers in
sectors of agriculture, community economic
development, education, environment,
health, and youth development. Peace Corps
volunteers live abroad for a total of 27
months as they work on community-level
projects designed to “modernize” and
“elevate” developing host nations—projects
that, for example, improve literacy rates,
lower child mortality rates, and increase
sustainable farming practices.1
Prior to service, volunteers undergo
10-12 weeks of pre-service training that
equips them to work in their sector, teaches
them the language(s) spoken at site, and
provides cultural context to prepare them for
life in their host country 1\. During service,
volunteers are paired with local civilian
counterparts who help volunteers address
their communities’ needs (GAO 1990, 48).
The three goals of the Peace Corps are to
provide countries with trained assistance, for

Historical Context
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“lacked the type of integrative values that
theorists identified with […] stable, Western
democracies,” making them “extremely
vulnerable to communism and its seductive
claims of social reform, political order, and
economic growth”.4
This language is nearly identical to
that used by British colonist Arthur James
Balfour, in his 1910 address to the British
House of Commons, famously critiqued in
Edward Said’s Orientalism.5 “Orientalism,”
as Said describes, “is the ineradicable
distinction between Western superiority and
Oriental inferiority. [It is] a political version
of reality whose structure promoted the
difference between the familiar (Europe, the
West, ‘us’) and the strange (the Orient, the
East, ‘them’)”. 5 An early proponent of the
“Orientalism” theory, Balfour defends
British colonization and occupation in
“Oriental” countries by stating “the facts of
the case” 5: Western nations as soon as they
emerge into history show the beginnings of
those capacities for self[-]government
having merits of their own… You may look
through the whole history of the Orientals in
what is called, broadly speaking, the East,
and you never find traces of selfgovernment. […] never in all the revolutions
of fate and fortune have you seen one of
those nations of its own motion establish
what we, from a Western point of view, call
self-government. 5
Balfour does a number of things in
his assertion. First, he divides the world in
half by distinguishing a strong binary
between the “East” and “West”. Second, he
associates “the West” with moral prowess
and leadership, while labeling the lessdeveloped “East” as incapable. Lastly,

Balfour reduces the historical, cultural, and
political achievements of Egypt to nothing
more than a country deserving of foreign
domination. This condescending attitude
fueled imperialistic practices, as it
empowered Western nations to colonize and
exploit developing countries and rebuild
according to their own ideals. Sadly, these
processes persist today, although no longer
demonstrated through physical military
imposition as it was in earlier centuries.
Instead, many Western countries continue to
exercise influence over parts of the world
through economic, political, and social
pressures—practices known as
neocolonialism.
This type of neocolonialist discourse
was present in the Kennedy Administration
during the early 1960s. Walt Whitman
Rostow, one of Kennedy’s top economic
advisors, argued the new challenge for U.S.
foreign policy “was to disguise development
in a way that was desirable for those who
had previously been under colonial rule”.6
Rostow recognized that America needed to
create a model of development that stressed
“national liberation” and economic
independence in order to entice newlyindependent countries away from
communist ideals. 6
By reiterating Balfour’s belief that
developing countries were incapable of selfgovernance, the Kennedy Administration
wished to extend American “assistance”
overseas to subtly exercise control over
periphery states in the East. This sense of
American authority comes from the belief
that the American experience (its colonial
history yet subsequent rise to power) is
exceptional—a belief that “establish[ed] a
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polarity between the United States and the
rest of the world”.7 This exceptionalism was
reinforced after World War II, when the
U.S. began exercising a more dominant
presence around the world and in “the
Orient”—a feat historically reserved for
European powers (Said 2003, 11-12). In
doing so, the United States solidified its
position as a fully-developed, Western
country and began to apply this sense of
entitlement to its relations with the Eastern
world.
This East/West dichotomy equated
terms like “development” and “progress”
with American notions of democracy,
capitalism, and equality, while
“undeveloped” and “traditional” societies
elsewhere became synonymous with the
opposite—thus implying they were prime
targets for communist infestation. Here, it is
clear how notions of development were (and
continue to be) based on European societal
values and disadvantages other ways of
measuring life, health, economy, and
happiness. This divide in development
theory still exists today, though terms like
“First vs. Third World” and “Global North
vs. South” more commonly refer to the
divide. 7 By equipping this rhetoric and
framing intervention as rescuing “backward
societies” from communist ruin, America
could defend its own international meddling
through neocolonial tactics. 6 With this in
mind, Kennedy established the two most
recognizable U.S. development agencies
within the first few months of his
presidency—the Peace Corps and the U.S.
Agency for International Development—
both with the intention of preventing the
spread of communism. In doing so, the

Peace Corps provided a “friendlier, more
casual alternative” to diplomacy, thus
making it an ideal neocolonial cover for the
United States’ political, economic, social,
and ideological overhaul in developing
nations. 6

Neocolonial Rhetoric in Early Peace
Corps History
Neocolonial discourse was heard by
the American public in 1961, when
President Kennedy proudly declared at his
inauguration, “To those peoples in the huts
and villages of half the globe struggling to
break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge
our best efforts to help them help
themselves, for whatever period is required”
(“Inaugural Address”). This reinforced the
East/West divide and labelled people in
developing countries as “helpless” by
asserting that they lack the necessary tools
to “help themselves”. It also implied that
“unless something American is brought in
[or] unless Americans use their
exceptionality to empower, […] the [other]
culture will remain static”. 8 In this course of
action, the Peace Corps was established to
“save” people in the East from their “huts
and villages” and to provide them with the
same opportunities, resources, and freedoms
Americans enjoyed in the West.
Though portrayed as purely
altruistic, Peace Corps methods of “helping
others” operated within and perpetuated
power differentials—a structure in which the
United States had “positional superiority”. 9
This “positional superiority” situated the
U.S. on top, followed closely by European
hegemons, with the rest of the “developing
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world” trailing below. This hierarchy of
power fit right into Kennedy’s early
development theories. Walt Whitman
Rostow once famously said that “the
development of nations is a little like the
development of human beings,” suggesting
“a mature, advanced society could take the
hands of wayward, childlike ones and guide
them into the adulthood of modernity”. 9 By
comparing newly independent countries to
helpless children in need of care from older,
more established democratic nations,
Rostow asserted that development could not
occur without Western guidance and
influence.
This echoes Edward Said’s analysis
of the Oriental-European relationship. To
quote Said, the key “feature of [these]
relations was that Europe was always in a
position of strength [...] True, the
relationship of strong to weak could be
disguised or mitigated […] but the essential
relationship [would always be] between a
strong and weak partner”.10 By attempting to
“disguise” and “mitigate” American
influence through development, the United
States was able to justify self-asserting itself
into the affairs of developing countries in an
effort to modernize them.
In truth, this process of
modernization was simply “a means for the
continued assertion of the privileges and
rights of [the] dominant power” onto a
colonized people.9 By placing Peace Corps
volunteers in countries with colonial
histories, it was easy for the U.S. to use
neocolonial tactics to encourage their
dependency. This is where the process is
intentionally deceitful. “In order to make
[neocolonialism] attractive to those upon

whom it is practised it must be shown as
capable of raising their living standards,”
however, the ultimate “economic objective
of neo-colonialism is to keep those standards
depressed in the interest of the developed
countries. It is only when this contradiction
is understood that the failure of innumerable
‘aid’ programmes [...] can be explained”
(Nkrumah 1966, xv). In this way, the United
States was able to demonstrate a public
“commit[ment] to self-determination for
all”, while using the Peace Corps to
reinforce relationships of dependency
around the world. 11

Ethnocentric Arrogance Within the
Peace Corps
It was President Kennedy’s “help
them help themselves” declaration in 1961
that best exemplified the problem in
international development. While it
appeared noble on the surface, his statement
perpetuated the East/West divide and
equipped patronizing phrasing that has
propelled the field of development for years.
With his statement, Kennedy placed the duty
of assistance on American citizens—
essentially creating a 20th century equivalent
to the “White Man’s Burden”. Named after
the poem by Rudyard Kipling, the “White
Man’s Burden” concept “assumes the
American as the standard of perfection” and
states that those with this privilege must
help the “Other to develop both
economically and culturally” in order to
share their liberties and freedoms.12 For the
Peace Corps, this “Burden” is “coupled with
the idea of American exceptionalism” and
applied within the Eurocentric framework of
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development, making it additionally
problematic. 12 As a result, Kennedy’s
promise of mobilizing Americans to “break
the bonds of mass misery” sent the message
that Americans had the inherent ability and
responsibility to reduce the world’s
inequities, reinforcing the belief that those in
developing countries needed a savior. 13
Though the term “White Savior
Complex” wasn’t officially coined by Teju
Cole until 2012, early PC rhetoric had been
fully embodying this term since 1961. 14 Just
like the “White Man’s Burden,” the “White
Savior Complex” is demonstrated when
white people (often those in Western
countries) and set out to “save” others
(predominantly people of color in lessdeveloped countries) that they have deemed
less fortunate. Here, race is an important
factor because it acknowledges that selfrighteous assumptions in development (for
instance, the assumption others need your
help and that the “world exists simply to
satisfy the needs […] of white people”) are
all deeply rooted in white supremacist
ideologies. 15
These racist and Eurocentric
sentiments remain on full display in current
Peace Corps materials. As former volunteer
Michael Buckler points out, “a prime
example” of the Peace Corps’ “hallmarks of
saviorism” is the agency’s official motto:
“Make the Most of Your World”. 16 “The
message is clear: The world is yours, go
forth and fix it”. 16 This phrasing literally
tells American volunteers they are entitled to
the world and when one considers how PC
recruits are predominantly white, while host
countries consist primarily of people of
color, it reinforces notions of white

supremacy. 17 This motto affirms the belief
that any American, regardless of
qualifications, can provide assistance to and
“save” those in developing countries, simply
because of their American privilege.
These racial dynamics are
entrenched within development work. Just
as the East/West binary instilled a hierarchy
between developed and developing
countries, so too has an imbalance of power
been established between white and nonwhite people. As a result of years of
conquest and colonization by white
Europeans, “the West” has become
synonymous with “white”, while places in
“the East” are “Othered” and labeled “nonwhite.” “This brings us back to the
fundamental bias [that] Europeans
conquered the world because their nature
was predisposed to it, while non-Europeans
were colonized because their nature
condemned them to it”.18 “Racism appears,
then, not as an incidental detail,” Albert
Memmi writes, “but as a consubstantial part
of colonialism”. 18 Because white supremacy
plays a significant role in development
theory, the “positional superiority” the U.S.
benefits from is now dually compounded by
race, as a majority-white nation.
This intersection of power,
nationalism, and race is consistent with the
findings made by Jenna Hanchey, a returned
Peace Corps volunteer who researched the
impact of race and colonization on stories of
service from former volunteers 19. In her
graduate dissertation, Hanchey reveals “the
intricate connection that postcolonial
theoretical issues have to issues of race and
ethnicity. Though colonialism should never
be reduced to racism,” she writes, “the act is

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2021
28
https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol4/iss1/1

28

et al.: Volume 4, Issue 1

intricately tied to race”. 19 These racial
ideologies were not abandoned when
physical, militaristic colonization was traded
for more discreet neocolonial tactics.
Instead, racism continues to be perpetuated
within neocolonial development structures.
Eurocentrism is another ideology
upheld in the field of development. Similar
to ethnocentrism, which judges one’s own
cultural norms and values as the only
“correct” or “moral” way to behave,
Eurocentrism believes any behavior outside
of European or Western norms “is wrong
and misguided[,] that other cultures are
decidedly inferior”. 20 This belief echoes all
previous assertions made by Balfour and
Rostow. Additionally, the interchangeability
of “democratic values” and “capitalistic
economies” with the developed “West” and
opposite qualities with the undeveloped
“East” allows one to conclude that the
notion of “development” is inherently
measured in Eurocentric ways.
Despite its inextricable ties to
development, Eurocentric behavior does
clash with current PC goals of integration.
By demonstrating these attitudes in service,
volunteers risk offending their host
communities, damaging local relationships,
and being interpreted as elitist and narrowminded. Instead, it is crucial for volunteers
to practice cultural relativity as they learn to
integrate into their host communities and
build positive intercultural relationships—
two markers of successful Peace Corps
service. 20
The first critique that identified this
type of problematic behavior in Peace Corps
service came in 1968, when Harvard
University’s student-run newspaper

published a scathing op-ed written by former
volunteers. 21 The article read, “We now see
that the Peace Corps is arrogant and
colonialist in the same way as the
government of which it is a part. […] It is a
blindness produced by the arrogance of a
nation that thinks itself capable of solving
all the world’s problems with its own
techniques”. 21 Here, former volunteers
condemned the agency for perpetuating
American superiority and admitted, that
instead of “the antithesis [of] American
colonialism” that Kennedy had promised,
the Peace Corps truly was “imposing the
United States’ political and cultural values”
on developing countries through neocolonial
means. 21
Today, the Peace Corps has put more
resources towards cultural sensitivity,
intercultural communication, and
integration, as they recognize effective
service cannot occur without these skills. In
the following section, I discuss how the
agency has begun to address issues of
American superiority, ethnocentrism, and
racial ideologies through mandatory staff
trainings that improve intercultural
competency and address topics of equity,
diversity, and inclusion.

Present Discourse: Intercultural
Competency, Diversity, and Inclusion
I turn now to the current discourse
within the agency to show how they are
tackling ethnocentrism through improved
intercultural training. To do so, I draw from
their official cross-cultural workbook,
Culture Matters, and assess two popular
training models: the Self-Other Bridge and
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Intercultural Code-Shifting. Here, I
specifically highlight the Intercultural
Competency, Diversity & Inclusion
(ICD&I) Team for their work to identify
workplace inequities, resolve conflict, and
provide support to the international Peace
Corps community.
The ICD&I Team is part of the
agency’s Office of Overseas Programming
and Training Support (OPATS), which
supervises the development,
implementation, and evaluation of all Peace
Corps training materials. In addition to
addressing themes of diversity, the
Intercultural Competency, Diversity &
Inclusion Team also addresses common
cross-cultural interactions that occur during
service. These can include adjustment issues
faced by volunteers, a lack of support for
minority and/or marginalized Peace Corps
staff, and communication setbacks between
Americans and host country nationals. 22
For three months prior to service,
soon-to-be volunteers receive language,
technical, and cross-cultural training in order
to prepare them for service. During this
period, each prospective volunteer receives a
copy of the official PC cross-cultural
workbook, Culture Matters, and begins to
gain the skills necessary to navigate their
new surroundings and the cultural
differences that arise “between the volunteer
and the people they’re working with”. 22 To
aid the adjustment process and encourage
best practices among volunteers, ICD&I
specialists use two popular models within
the field of intercultural communication: the
Self-Other Bridge and Intercultural CodeShifting. 22 In a 2019 training webinar,
ICD&I Specialists Emily Clawson and

D’Lynn Jacobs explain these two models
and apply them to common Peace Corps
settings. 22
First, the Self-Other Bridge Model
requires the self-analysis of “one’s own
reactions and worldview,” in addition to the
consideration of others’ perspectives in a
given scenario. 22 By asking oneself if
adjustments could be made to achieve
similar behaviors to others in the interaction,
these strategies can help to “bridge” the
“self-other” divide and create a more
inclusive and equitable space (2019). While
intercultural communication goes beyond
simple verbal exchanges, language-learning
is a common bridge method. This is an
important bridging tool, as Albert Memmi
points out, because “two tongues are in
conflict” in places with colonial histories:
“those of the colonizer and the colonized”. 23
By using language to bridge the colonial
power divide and communicate with others
in their native tongue, volunteers often
report better interactions and improved
feelings of cultural adjustment. 22
Jacobs, who also serves as the
Director of Programming and Training in
Vanuatu, finds that speaking the local
language of Bislama is a “great way to
develop effective and healthy relationships
with [her] team,” earn their trust, and allow
her coworkers to feel “valued” and “seen”.
24
Clawson, a Supervisory ICD&I Specialist,
agrees and says she always tries to “learn the
basics of greeting people in their own
language because that can allow me to […]
create a space where it’s not just one group
of people who always has to speak a
language that’s not their first” (2019).
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The second intercultural model PC
uses is the Code-Shifting technique. 24 Codeshifting refers to “intentionally modifying
one’s own behavior to be appropriate and
effective in a particular context” and often
happens when one person recognizes a
difference in engaging with another and
alters their own approach in order to
peacefully or more effectively interact with
the other. 24
It is important here to reiterate the
role that power plays in international
interactions. As stated throughout this paper,
the Peace Corps wields a great deal of power
in host countries as a U.S. government
agency. Even with attempts to balance out
this power, American volunteers and staff
still benefit from this “positional
superiority”—whether they are conscious of
this dynamic or not. The problem that
occurs, Clawson admits, is that HCN staff
then constantly code-shift to fit American
norms and make their American coworkers
feel more comfortable (2019). Over time, it
is not only exhausting for them to keep
conforming to norms that are not their own,
but it reinforces power inequities that stem
from histories of colonization, imperialism,
and racist ideologies like white supremacy.
To best balance these power inequities, the
Peace Corps has highlighted the “need for
[volunteers] to code-shift culturally in
relation to their own communities” and
adapt to host culture norms, rather than the
other way around. 24
Both the Self-Other Bridge and
Code-Shifting techniques require constant
deliberate effort to be sensitive to cultural
differences and to be aware of existing
power dynamics. This is crucial, Clawson

explains, because “when you’re aware of
what’s going on, you can be intentional
about the choices that you make” (2019).
Jacobs echoes this, recognizing that by
asking her staff to speak English during
meetings instead of the local language of
Bislama, “[I] would be leveraging my power
as a U.S. American staff member, in this
U.S. American organization, in their
country”. 24 Instead, Jacobs finds that
speaking the local language is “more
appropriate for me to do my work and be
equitable […] because this is the country in
which we serve”. 24
As demonstrated by these ICD&I
Specialists, PC intercultural training requires
a great deal of self-reflection, or as Hanchey
calls it, “self-reflexivity”. “Self-reflexivity,”
the former Peace Corps volunteer writes,
“requires an acknowledgement and
challenging of our own structures and
structural ideologies”. 25Furthermore,
Hanchey argues that a postcolonial approach
is necessary when working in international
development as it analyzes “the underlying
Eurocentric assumptions of both one’s field
and one’s own research, in order to root out
‘latent ideological structures that inform our
scholarship and practices’”. 26The damage,
Hanchey claims, occurs when volunteers
“perform the role of ‘development’ without
bringing into question the global power
differentials upon which development work
is based”. 26
Here, ICD&I Specialist Clawson
demonstrates postcolonial self-reflexivity as
she analyzes her own identity “as an
English-speaking white woman” and
position “in the facilitator space of
privilege” when conducting ICD&I
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workshops in host countries (Clawson
2019). “When I’m going to countries that
have a history of being colonized by
English-speaking white people (or other
white people), I think it’s really key to […]
do that Self-Other Bridge process and ask
myself, ‘what cultural norms am I
privileging?’ [Do] I make everyone code
shift to me or do I intentionally look for
ways to honor a diversity of ways of being?”
27

By exemplifying the standards set in
ICD&I practice, Clawson demonstrates how
important it is to name the power structures
present, recognize how one’s identity exists
within those structures, and consider the
perspectives of others in the interaction.
This work from the Intercultural
Competency, Diversity and Inclusion
(ICD&I) Team demonstrates how the Peace
Corps has been prioritizing better crosscultural training, intercultural
communication, and awareness around
power dynamics to create equitable and
inclusive relationships. These ICD&I
practices are incredibly impactful as they
promote self-reflexivity and awareness on
an individual level, while also ensuring the
broader PC community shares a common
vocabulary that reflects intercultural
competency standards. 27 That said, I argue
intercultural training is not enough to
neutralize the systemic damage caused by
the agency, or enough to alleviate the
“positional superiority” the Peace Corps
benefits from as an extension of the U.S.
government working to develop the
international community.

Overall Agency Analysis: Three
Structural Issues to Address
In this section, I reiterate how the
Peace Corps is perpetuating harm by
analyzing three structural issues within its
framework that must be addressed. First, I
examine the lack of accountability offered
by the agency as a result of its position
within the U.S. government. Second, I
explore the organization’s affinity for hiring
unqualified applicants, which perpetuates
issues of Western superiority, American
exceptionalism, and white saviorism. Third,
I question the agency’s failure to provide
proper support or compensation to host
country staff, as well as notice the lack of
local involvement in Peace Corps countries.
In each of these three sections, I propose
possible solutions to combat these structural
deficiencies and draw from outside
scholarship and critiques for support.

Structural Issue #1: PC’s Position as a
U.S. Government Entity
The biggest problem facing the
Peace Corps and its future, I argue, is the
agency’s own position as a part of the
United States government. The Peace Corps’
close ties to the U.S. government has helped
solidify its “positional superiority” in the
field of international development and the
power that accompanies this privilege—no
matter how “nonlegitimate” the privilege
is—has affected every aspect of the agency,
including each intercultural interaction made
by those in service. 28 This power has also
prevented the organization from taking true
accountability for the harm it has caused,
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whether through deceptive neocolonial
tactics, the imposition of Eurocentric
measures of development, or through the
extension of U.S. foreign policy interests.
As a result, I argue that while the Peace
Corps remains connected to and funded by
the U.S. federal government, it cannot begin
to take responsibility for damage it has
caused, nor can it boast of the “equitable
intercultural relationships” it helps to form,
when its structure remains one of
neocolonialism.
The presence of the federal
government within PC structure allows the
agency a sort of “untouchable privilege.”
The Peace Corps would never acknowledge
its role in foreign interference because, by
doing so, it would implicate the United
States government. This allows the agency
to be entirely complicit. This “privilege” and
resulting lack of accountability is exactly
why Kwame Nkrumah, the former Prime
Minister and President of Ghana, despised
neocolonialism. “For those who practice it,”
he writes in his book, Neo-Colonialism: The
Last Stage of Imperialism,
“[neocolonialism] means power without
responsibility and for those who suffer from
it, it means exploitation without redress”.29
The former volunteers of Harvard
Crimson’s article made this crucial
observation in 1968 when they found “the
bureaucratic loyalty of these administrators
is to Washington” only, and not to the
volunteers, staff, or communities the agency
is supposed to serve.30 Sadly, nothing has
changed in the decades since that article was
published.
For these reasons, we cannot expect
the Peace Corps to suddenly take full

accountability for the harm it has caused,
acknowledge the role it has played (and
continues to play) in the neocolonial
oppression of developing countries, attempt
to remedy its structural inequities, or trust
the agency to conduct a deep, meaningful,
and lasting reform. Instead, many argue the
ideologies that helped establish the Peace
Corps are too integral within PC structure to
be removed. Of these in dissent, the group
“Decolonizing Peace Corps” (a collection of
former PC volunteers who criticize the
“unethical” system they participated in) is
vocally advocating for the agency’s
abolition. 31
In a slightly different approach, the
former volunteers in the Harvard Crimson
piece advocated for a separation of the
organization from the U.S. government and
suggested the Peace Corps be turned “into
an internationally administered agency,”
“where administrative power is shared by
representatives of various societies [and]
where the interplay of their differing
interests produces truly flexible programs
that can be transferred from culture to
culture, rather than imposed by one culture
on another”. 32
Merely privatizing the agency will
not solve its problems but the suggestion of
internationalizing it makes a great deal of
sense. By having better oversight and
external assessments, it would allow for
more accountability, greater local input, and
fewer Americans in positions of power in
foreign countries. However, for as long as
the Peace Corps remains a mechanism of the
U.S. government and benefits from the
“positional superiority” it receives as such,
the agency cannot effectively demonstrate
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equitable intercultural partnerships on a
large-scale international level.

Structural Issue #2: Inexperienced and
Unqualified Hires
One of the most consistent gripes
against the Peace Corps has been for their
fondness in hiring inexperienced volunteers
who lack the specialized skills that
developing countries often request, like
“doctors, education specialists, and crop
extensionists,”.33 While all volunteers
undergo training prior to service, this
instruction is sometimes the first technical
experience some receive in their sector and
it is insufficient for many: the agency’s own
2009 Annual Volunteer Survey revealed 1 in
4 volunteers reported their job-related
training as ineffective or poor and that
“technical training [ranked] the lowest of the
five training areas”.34 This technical training
should not be the first experience volunteers
have in their sector; however, this is often
the case, as PC recruits “B.A. generalists,”
or young college graduates with liberal arts
degrees, who still lack “the specific training
or professional employment sought by the
host nations”. 35
Despite other agency-wide reforms,
the Peace Corps’ recruitment of
inexperienced volunteers remains consistent
and, if anything, has gotten worse. In 1965,
70% of recruited volunteers were generalists
that lacked specialized skills36, whereas this
number had increased to 85% in 2019. 37
This hiring trend reflects a deeply-held
belief that unskilled and inexperienced
Americans are still qualified enough to
provide new insights and assistance to

developing countries. This is a dangerous
and arrogant assumption that connects
directly to Western superiority, American
exceptionalism, the white savior complex,
and colonizer behavior.
I argue this hiring trend will not
significantly change for two reasons. First
and foremost, the trend and its
accompanying belief in Western superiority
is inseparable from PC values and early
goals: it was President Kennedy’s original
belief that “all volunteers were capable of
giving the ‘underdeveloped’ nations ‘a hand
in building a society’”, regardless of their
actual qualifications. 36 Secondly,
recommendations to hire more qualified
applicants and focus resources on the
“improvement of technical training” and
“additional training days for volunteers”
have been previously made by the agency’s
own internal assessments, but to no avail.38
In order to show their values are no longer
in line with arrogant notions of Western
superiority, the Peace Corps needs to
rebrand their recruitment materials, come up
with a more equitable and culturallysensitive motto (as opposed to the current
“Make the Most of Your World” which is
thick with American entitlement), and hire
only technically-qualified applicants with
relevant field experience in the future.

Structural Issue #3: Failure to Prioritize
Local Leadership
As mentioned earlier, there are two
elements of the existing Peace Corps model
that incorporate host country national input:
the assignment of a local civilian counterpart
to each volunteer during service and the host
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country national hires that staff Peace Corps
country offices. The goals of these two
elements were to prioritize the “partnership”
between Americans and host country
nationals; to reduce ethnocentric
assumptions of development by informing
volunteers of pre-existing community needs;
and to provide the agency with local
representation to ensure a cooperative and
equal environment.39 While these goals are
great in theory, they have not worked well in
practice. Below, I discuss three problems
that exist in the PC model, as they relate to
local host country national staff.
The first issue here is that the Peace
Corps does not pay civilian counterparts in
the way that host country staff receives
reimbursements or salaries.40 This
fundamentally devalues their input,
dismisses their efforts to assist volunteers in
establishing community projects, and
reinforces the idea that HCNs are less
important than the volunteers they serve
alongside. In order to repair this,
“Decolonizing Peace Corps” has outlined
demands for financial compensation and
increased counterpart involvement, urging
that “counterparts [be] paid on the basis of
2-5 year fellowships” and “be responsible
for completing community assessments,
identifying projects, [and] applying for and
managing grants” so they have more control
over the projects and finances in their local
communities. 40
The second issue that arises is the
dual responsibility of host country nationals.
Host country staff are hired to both provide
support to volunteers and provide HCN
representation. This is problematic because,
when locals play a secondary “supportive”

role to volunteers, it centers Americans
when volunteers should be the ones
supporting local community leaders.
Additionally, mere host country
representation does not automatically create
beneficial multicultural spaces, just as the
recruitment of diverse identities does not
solve racism. Instead, the Peace Corps must
prioritize ICD&I measures to ensure its
workplaces are safe for non-Americans and
that HCN suggestions, concerns and efforts
will be heard and appreciated.
The third issue that exists is the lack
of employment opportunities for host
country nationals to serve the Peace Corps.
Only Americans are eligible to become
Volunteers or Country Directors, yet even
HCN staff positions are often limited in
what they can offer the agency. 40 This
deficiency in the organization’s structure
fails to encourage more local input,
guidance, and feedback (something PC
would highly benefit from) and reinforces
the idea that the Peace Corps exists
primarily for Americans. Following their
suggestion to “internationalize the Peace
Corps,” the former volunteers of the
Harvard Crimson piece envisioned a model
where locals could “plan and direct
programs in [their own countries]” and
Americans, if they still wanted to serve,
could “put themselves in subordinate
positions, [and] allow themselves to be
really used by the people who live [there]”.41
While this is far from the current PC
structure, I argue the benefits of an
internationalized plan like this one would
allow for more HCN staff positions and
leadership roles—thus allowing locals to
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play a substantial role in their own
development.

Conclusion
The most pressing steps the Peace
Corps can take towards accountability
include separating itself from the United
States government and federal funding;
acknowledging its intentionally deceitful
past and role as a neocolonial actor; and
working to address several structural issues
within its model—like answering to the
countries and communities it “serves”,
hiring only qualified applicants as
volunteers, and incorporating more host
country leadership and input into its
organizational structure.
That said, I acknowledge how even
if the agency were to take these steps and
rebrand itself entirely, its fundamental
nature as an international development
organization operates within a field based on
Eurocentric values and relies on “global
power differentials”.42 Here, I reiterate the
problem that is the Peace Corps in and of
itself—a United States government agency
that was established with clear neocolonial
intent and uses federal funds to exploit
developing countries in the name of
American foreign policy interests. It is their
“positional superiority” as a U.S.
government entity within the field of
international development that prevents the
agency from being held truly accountable
for the harm they have caused.
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The KyrgyzstanUzbekistan Border:
A Legacy of Soviet
Imperialism
LIAM ABBATE

Abstract
Kyrgyzstan, a small country in Central Asia,
shares a complex border with its neighbor
Uzbekistan. While these borders were
created during the Soviet era, and were
drawn by leaders in Moscow, in the postSoviet years new problems have arisen from
the complex borders. A number of different
ethnic groups are spread amongst the five
Uzbek exclaves and two Tajik exclaves that
are located adjacent to Kyrgyz territory.
This difficult set of national borders also
complicates sharing the water that flows thru
the Ferghana Valley.

Introduction
In this paper, I will analyze the international
border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan, and how the contemporary
Uzbek-Kyrgyz border’s division of the
surrounding ethnic groups remains as a
legacy of the Soviet era. I start by explaining
the complicated border which is the basis for
the dispute. I then examine the origins of the
dispute back in the Soviet era, before
moving on to developments in the dispute
since Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan gained
their independence in. Finally, I explore the
wider geopolitical implications of the
dispute, particularly in relation to the U.S.China rivalry.

Background
Kyrgyzstan is among the poorest of the
nations of Central Asia: its per capita is a
mere tenth of its larger neighbor
Kazakhstan.1 Formerly a constituent
republic of the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics, the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist
Republic declared independence as
Kyrgyzstan on August 31, 1991. Between
1924 and 1927 Soviet officials drew curly
borders for their then-constituent republics,
and in the process, they separated groups of
Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tajiks inhabiting the
Ferghana Valley:2 home to nearly one
quarter of Central Asia’s population.3
Unlike the other former Soviet
republics of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan has
largely experienced democracy since
independence. Revolutions ousted the
Kyrgyz presidents in 2005 and 2010; the
former revolution was peaceful, while the
latter included carnage in its chronology.4
Furthermore, a competitive election in 2017
resulted in a peaceful transition from
President Almazbek Atambayev to his
protégé Sooronbay Jeenbekov, without a
revolution. However, despite handing over
power, former President Atambayev
continues to harshly criticize the actions of
his successor. President Jeenbekov has also
worked to consolidate his power, as he has
threatened to imprison a political opponent
of his – Ömürbek Babanov – on the charge
of inciting conflict between the ethnics
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.5
Kyrgyzstan lies between Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan in the west and south, China
in the east, and Kazakhstan in the north. The
country is covered in mountains with 88
mountain ranges.6 These mountain ranges
separate communities within Kyrgyzstan,
contributing to regional differences and
national instability.7 The capital of Bishkek
is the main population center for northern
Kyrgyzstan, while the area between Jalal-
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Abad and Osh comprises the most populated
part of southern Kyrgyzstan. As seen in
Figure 1, the former lies just South of
Kazakhstan while the latter area lies just east
of Uzbekistan; Osh and Bishkek are two
cities the lie outside of the seven oblasts
(regions) and hold an equivalent status as
the oblasts.8
The Ferghana Valley is an area
divided among Kyrgyzstan and its
neighbors: Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The
valley’s fertile agricultural land produces a
large amount of food for Central Asia, while
subject to the availability of water.9 The
twisting borders and narrow stretches of
land are relics of Soviet rule and continue to
cause disputes between Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan. Its 10 million inhabitants
include ethnic Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks.10
However, during the Soviet era, residents
became accustomed to their ability to cross
the inter-Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), as
the Ferghana Valley lacked the border
controls present in other areas of the Soviet
Union.11

Figure 1. Political Divisions of Kyrgyzstan, map
from Bigstock (Richard Weitz, “Kyrgyzstan and the
Afghan Campaign’s Logistical Challenges,” Second
Line Defense, last modified November 16, 2011,
https://sldinfo.com/2011/11/kyrgyzstan-and-theafghan-campaigns-logistical-challenges/.).

Misaligned Ethnicities in the Ferghana
Valley
While many countries have borders
that were drawn arbitrarily, Kyrgyzstan’s
borders are especially problematic. There
are five exclaves where portions of Uzbek
territory are completely surrounded by
Kyrgyzstan: Sokh, Shohimardon, Chon
Qora/Qalacha, and Jani-Ayil (Halmiyon), as
well as two Tajik exclaves.12 At 350 km2,
Sokh is the largest of these exclaves, and
according to Baumgartner, has experienced
several conflicts between its 50,000 Uzbek
citizens and the guards securing the Kyrgyz
border.13 To complicate matters further,
Sokh’s residents are 99% ethnic Tajiks.14
This mismatch of residency and identity is
not unique to the Sokh exclave; national
borders separate divide ethnic groups of the
Ferghana Valley while pushing together
other distinct groups (fig. 2; fig. 3).15
Furthermore, this disconnect between ethnic
identity and location within national
boundaries is especially pronounced in
northern Tajikistan, where Uzbeks and
Tajiks are interspersed16 like chocolate and
vanilla in a marble cake.

Figure 2. Political Map of the Ferghana Valley
(Sabatar, “Normalization process between.”).
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Figure 3. Demographics of the Fergana Valley
(“Central Asia: Tensions.”).

Ethnic tensions in the region are
nothing new and most recently flared up in
2010 when clashes between the two ethnic
groups left hundreds of locals dead.17 The
Soviet era infrastructure impacts
contemporary disagreements over water
resources and the border itself. A Sovietbuilt network of canals connects the water
supply systems of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan, causing disagreements over
how much water each of the three “stans”
should receive.18 In general, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan have an abundance of water but
lack electricity, while Uzbekistan (and
Kazakhstan) have excess electricity but a
scarce amount of water.19 There have been
multiple efforts to improve the water
distribution system in the Ferghana Valley.
The world bank funded improvements and
modernizations in Uzbekistan’s water
infrastructure from 2010 to 2016.20
Similarly, the International Water
Management Institute had a project started
in 2001 which sought to respect local needs
for water resources and improve the soil
fertility in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and
Tajikistan.21 In 2017, Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan were able to agree on a dam on
the Naryn River, while in 2018,
Uzbekistan’s president announced his
support for the Rogun dam in Tajikistan.
Continued cooperation is possible, provided
the three nations are willing to overlook the
“deep-seated mistrust”22 that currently
exists.

Throughout history the Ferghana
Valley had been subjected and inhabited by
numerous cultures, such as the Greeks,
Arabs, Mongols, and Turks, all of which
affected the socio-political landscape of the
valley.23 In the mid-19th century Tsarist
Russia conquered the Ferghana Valley from
the Khanate of Qo’qon.24 Also known as
Kokand, the Khanate was not ethnicallybased, but rather was a “dynastic and feudal
entity.”25
Many of the issues from the KyrgyzUzbek border and other borders in the
region are a product of Russian imperialism
– first in the way of the Russian Empire, and
later by the hand of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR). Before 1924,
when the creation of the KyrgyzstanUzbekistan border began, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan had not existed as sovereign
states. According to Megoran, there were
not Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic groups quite
the way there are today.26 Before the
creation of the border in the 1920s, ethnic
identification was not familiar to many
inhabitants of Central Asia.27 The history of
migrations in the region had not provided
clear, geographically segregated ethnic
groups. The Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, and
Kazakhs likely all descended from the
people inhabiting the Uzbek confederation
of the fifteenth century.28 The origins of the
Kyrgyz people are less clear, but the
consensus is that part of the Kyrgyz
population migrated from southern Siberia
to modern Kyrgyzstan in the fifteenth
century, but that another portion of the
Kyrgyz population is descended from
nomads who had arrived in the region long
before the fifteenth century.29 When
considered on the basis of language, the
Tajiks are distinct from the other four large
ethnic groups of post-Soviet Central Asia:
the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and
Turkmens,30 who all speak Turkic
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languages.31 The Tajik Language, however,
is a relative of Persian.32
The Soviet Union selected historical
designations and used them as the basis for
ethnicities, by codifying distinct languages,
selecting capitals for the union republics,
and compiling national historiographies.33
The ethnicity names created by the Soviet
Union did not match the self-identification
of residents of Central Asia: boundary
surveyors reported confusion about
matching people to ethnic labels if their own
labels were not on the official list of Central
Asian ethnonyms. Perhaps most
consequentially, the Soviet officials drew
borders between the Uzbek Soviet Socialist
Republic (SSR), the Kirghiz SSR, and the
other central Asian SSRs. Even after the
creation of these borders, many residents did
not “distinguish between Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan”.34

A New International Border
Kyrgyzstan’s most important
relations are with its neighbors: Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and China, as well
as nearby Afghanistan and Turkmenistan.
Uzbekistan has accused both Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan of inadequately protecting
their borders, allowing an unlimited flow of
drugs to travel across the latter two
countries.35 Uzbekistan relied on its
authoritarian dictator Islam Karimov to
strongly enforce its borders – Karimov died
in 2016.
Upon independence in 1991, the
border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan
became an international border overnight.
Initially, the border was not tangible and the
respective countries made a minimal effort
to demarcate the border.36 However, over
the next few years, political and economic
differences between Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan caused the lenient border
practices to disintegrate. In 1993,

Uzbekistan temporarily closed its border to
Kyrgyzstan and introduced its own unique
currency. Later on, Uzbekistan abandoned
daylight savings time and adopted the Latin
alphabet, all the while Kyrgyzstan kept
daylight savings and the Cyrillic alphabet.37
Disagreements have pitted the Ferghana
Valley portion of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan against the remainder of the
respective countries. During the 1990s, the
Ferghana Valley played an important role in
Tajikistan’s civil war,38 providing many
anti-regime fighters.39 Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan also experienced regional
instability in the 1990s, in which their
portions of the Ferghana Valley experienced
unrest. During that period, there were
extremists from the Ferghana Valley who
executed sporadic attacks in southern
Kyrgyzstan.40
The situation between Uzbekistan
and Kyrgyzstan became more tense in 1999.
In January 1999, Uzbekistan closed its
border for an indefinite amount of time. On
February 13, 1999, President Karimov
declared that “Kyrgyzstan is a poor country,
and it is not my job to look after the
people”.41 In August 1999, The Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) – an
organization of “dissident Islamist guerillas
headed by Ferghana Valley exiles linked to
militant Islamist groups in Tajikistan and
Afghanistan”42 – invaded southern
Kyrgyzstan and adjacent areas of Tajikistan.
As a consequence of the IMU’s actions,
Uzbekistan began erecting a fence – which
is two meters high - along its Ferghana
Valley border; factories in Uzbekistan were
required to fire any employees who were
ethnically Kyrgyz. The creation of a
borderland continued as President Karimov
decreed that all visitors to Uzbekistan
staying longer than three days needed a
visa.43 Understandably, this did not go over
well with Kyrgyzstan, for as Karimov knew
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quite well, most Kyrgyzstan’s residents were
already struggling economically.
The Chinese and the Americans
The other important state actors
interacting with Kyrgyzstan are the U.S. and
Russia, who vie with China for influence in
Kyrgyzstan. The U.S. global war on terror
has affected Kyrgyzstan, albeit not as
severely as Afghanistan, and pressured it to
strengthen its border security.44 However,
Russia, China, and the U.S. do not place
Kyrgyzstan as a high priority, meaning each
state does not have the goal of eliminating
the influence of the other two.45
Nevertheless, these three major powers have
reasons to maintain an interest in
Kyrgyzstan.
China has the greatest reason to
worry; its officials fear that instability in the
Kyrgyz Republic could contribute to unrest
in China,46 particularly the autonomous
territory of Xinjiang which is home to a
large number of ethnic Uyghurs. Uyghurs
and Kyrgyz are both Turkic ethnic groups.
The U.S.’s concerns regarding Kyrgyzstan
derive from its proximity to Afghanistan:
only Tajikistan separates the two countries.
The short distance separating Kyrgyzstan
and Afghanistan has allowed the U.S. to use
Manas International Airport in the former
for its military operations in the latter.47 The
U.S. found this arrangement necessary after
Uzbekistan expelled U.S. military officers
from its territory in 2005.

Conclusion
The Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan border
dispute has taken a century to develop into
something threatening enough to make the
two neighbors adversaries of one another.
The borders as drawn by the Soviets fail to
align with the distribution of persons of
differing ethnicities; the enclaves only make
negotiations more difficult.48 Perhaps the
national borders could be redrawn by the

countries themselves, allowing the borders
to align with the ethnic groups in the valley.
It would also be beneficial for the countries
of the Ferghana Valley (Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) if they could
devise a plan to share the water in the valley.
The situation would also benefit from
Uzbekistan being more understanding of
Kyrgyzstan.
Yet, perhaps Uzbekistan is not the
biggest threat to Kyrgyzstan’s well-being.
Megoran argues that middle-class Kyrgyz
people worry most about the elites
destroying the country. Uzbeks agree, and
one Uzbek told a researcher that the ‘big
ones,’ or the wealthy elites, “keep gobbling
[up] [Kyrgyzstan] the way they are at the
moment, the mountains themselves may
disappear”.49 This reasoning suggests that
Kyrgyzstan’s income inequality is causing
issues that should not be neglected.
Logically, the residents hope for no
continuation of the environmental
degradation that occurred under Soviet rule,
although the Soviet environmental damage
persists in Kyrgyzstan50 – and other portions
of the former U.S.S.R. This hope of theirs
opposes any plans to exploit the land and the
common people of Kyrgyzstan for the
benefits of the wealthier elites. Creating a
more just and equitable society could
improve the socio-economic stability within
Kyrgyzstan.
The first step in decreasing income
inequality is to decrease corruption in the
Kyrgyz government. If the politicians in
power ceased imprisoning their opponents
or purging governmental officials they
quarreled with, government transparency
and fairness could emerge. If international
aid was permitted to reach the communities
it is intended to benefit, better economic
opportunities could emerge for all residents
of Kyrgyzstan. Providing more economic
opportunities for the economically
marginalized residents of Kyrgyzstan is the
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most promising solution to this border
dispute, because a major source of tension
over the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan border is
the movement of migrants from Kyrgyzstan
to Uzbekistan in search of better-paying
employment.51 Like many border disputes,
this dispute is a proxy: a proxy for the
sources of distress causing residents of
Kyrgyzstan to leave their homeland in
search of economic improvement in their
lives.
Bibliography
Arnold, Katie. “In Kyrgyzstan, Warming
Brings Less Water – And More Conflict.”
Reuters. Last modified November 8, 2018.
https://www.reuters.com/article/uskyrgyzstan-waterclimatechange/inkyrgyzstan-warming-brings-less-water-andmore-conflict- idUSKCN1NE0BW.
Baumgartner, Pete. “Tug-of-War:
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Look to Finally
Settle Decades-Old Border Dispute.”
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Last
modified December 14, 2017.
https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistankyrgyzstan-resolving-decades-old-borderdispute/28918059.html.
“Central Asia: Tensions grow in the
Ferghana Valley.” Stratfor. October 8, 2013.
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/central
-asia-tensions-grow-fergana-valley.
Dalbaeva, Alina. “End the Weaponisation of
Water in Central Asia.” International Crisis
Group. March 15, 2018.
https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-centralasia/central-asia/kazakhstan/endweaponisation-water-central-asia.
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica.
“Central Asia.” Encyclopaedia Britannica.
December 28, 2018.
https://www.britannica.com/place/CentralAsia.

“Ferghana Valley Water Resources
Management Phase-I Project.” The World
Bank. The World Bank Group. Last
modified November 30, 2020.
https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projectsoperations/project-detail/P110538.
Geography Now. “Geography Now!
Kyrgyzstan.” YouTube. January 24, 2018.
Video, 11:32. https://youtu.be/Wob_MpguLo.
Heyer, Evelyne, Patricia Balaresque, Mark
A. Jobling, Lluis Quintana-Murci, Raphaelle
Chaix, Laure Segurel, Almaz Aldashev, and
Tanya Hegay. “Genetic diversity and the
emergence of ethnic groups in Central
Asia.” BMC Genetics 10 (2009).
http://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2156-10-49.
Johanson, Lars. “Turkic Languages.”
Encyclopaedia Britannica. August 11, 2020.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Turkiclanguages.
“Kyrgyzstan’s Geographic Challenge.”
Stratfor. October 16, 2012.
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/kyrgyz
stans-geographic-challenge.
“Kyrgyzstan’s Neighbours Have Too Little
politics, but It Has Too Much.” The
Economist. April 17, 2019.
https://www.economist.com/asia/2019/04/17
/kyrgyzstans-neighbours-have-too-littlepolitics-but-it-has-too-much.
Megoran, Nick. “The Critical Geopolitics of
Danger in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.”
Environment and Planning D: Society and
Space 23, no. 4 (2005): 555-580
doi.org/10.1068%2Fd56j.
Megoran, Nick. “The Critical Geopolitics of
the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2021
44
https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol4/iss1/1

44

et al.: Volume 4, Issue 1

Border Dispute, 1999-2000.” Political
Geography 23, no. 6 (2004): 731-764.
doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2004.03.004.
Megoran, Nick. “Rethinking the Study of
International Boundaries: A Biography of
the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Boundary.”
Annals of the Association of American
Geographers 102, no. 2 (2012): 464-481.
doi.org/10.1080/00045608.2011.595969.
Sabatar, Akmaral. “Normalization Process
between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.” The
AsiaN. Last modified October 24, 2016.
http://www.theasian.asia/archives/96843.

Stratfor. “Central Asia: The Complexities of
the Ferghana Valley.” Forbes. Last modified
October 10, 2013.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2013/1
0/10/central-asia-the- complexities-of-thefergana-valley/#5f54e1aa238d.
Wegerich, Kai, Jusipbek Kazbekov, and
Murat Yakubov. “Integrated Water
Resources Management in the Ferghana
Valley.” International Water Management
Institute. Accessed December 6, 2020.
https://centralasia.iwmi.cgiar.org/projectsin-the-region/integrated-water-resourcesmanagement-in-the-ferghana-valley/

Sanderson, Thomas M. “From the
Ferghana Valley to Syria and Beyond: A
Brief History of Central Asian Foreign
Fighters.” Center for Strategic &
International Studies. January 5, 2018.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/ferghanavalley-syria-and-beyond-brief-historycentral-asian-foreign-fighters.

Weitz, Richard. “Kyrgyzstan and the
Afghan Campaign’s Logistical Challenges.”
Second Line Defense. Last modified
November 16, 2011.
https://sldinfo.com/2011/11/kyrgyzstan-andthe-afghan-campaigns-logistical-challenges/.

“Kyrgyzstan’s Neighbours Have Too Little
Politics, but It Has Too Much.” The Economist,
April 17, 2019.
2
Pete Baumgartner, “Tug-of-War: Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan Look to Finally Settle Decades-Old
Border Dispute,” Radio Free Europe/Radio.
3
Katie Arnold, “In Kyrgyzstan, Warming Brings
Less Water – And More Conflict,” Reuters, last
modified November 8, 2018.
4
“Kyrgyzstan’s Neighbours.”
5
Ibid,.
6
Geography Now, “Geography Now!
Kyrgyzstan,” YouTube, January 24, 2018,
video, 11:32.
7
“Kyrgyzstan’s Geographic Challenge,”
Stratfor, October 16, 2012.
8
Geography Now, “Geography Now!
Kyrgyzstan.”
9
Stratfor, “Central Asia: The Complexities of the
Ferghana Valley,” Forbes, last modified October
10, 2013.

10

1

Nick Megoran, “The Critical Geopolitics of
the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley
Border Dispute, 1999-2000,” Political
Geography 23, no. 6 (2004): 733, accessed May
31, 2019.
11
Nick Megoran, “Rethinking the Study of
International Boundaries: A Biography of the
Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Boundary,” Annals of
the Association of American Geographers 102,
no. 2 (2012): 471, accessed May 31, 2019.
12
Geography Now, “Geography Now!
Kyrgyzstan.”
13
Baumgartner, “Tug-of-War: Uzbekistan.”
14
Geography Now, “Geography Now!
Kyrgyzstan.”
15
Akmaral Sabatar, “Normalization Process
between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan,” The
AsiaN, last modified October 24, 2016, “Central
Asia: Tensions grow in the Ferghana Valley,”
Stratfor, October 8, 2013.
16
“Central Asia: Tensions.”

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2021
45
Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2021

45

Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 1

Lars Johanson, “Turkic Languages,”
Encyclopaedia Britannica, August 11, 2020,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Turkiclanguages.
32
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica,
“Central Asia.”
33
Megoran, “Rethinking the Study,” 470.
34
Ibid, 470.
35
Megoran, “The Critical Geopolitics of the
Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan,” 742.
36
Megoran, “Rethinking the Study,” 472.
37
Ibid, 473.
38
“Central Asia: Tensions.”
39
Thomas M. Sanderson, “From the Ferghana
Valley to Syria and Beyond: A Brief History of
Central Asian Foreign Fighters,” Center for
Strategic & International Studies, January 5,
2018.
31

“Kyrgyzstan’s Neighbours.”
18
Katie Arnold, “In Kyrgyzstan, Warming
Brings Less Water – And More Conflict,”
Reuters, last modified November 8, 2018.
19
Alina Dalbaeva, “End the Weaponisation of
Water in Central Asia,” International Crisis
Group, March 15, 2018.
20
“Ferghana Valley Water Resources
Management Phase-I Project,” The World Bank,
The World Bank Group, last modified
November 30, 2020.
17

21

Kai Wegerich, Jusipbek Kazbekov, and Murat
Yakubov, “Integrated Water Resources
Management in the Ferghana Valley,”
International Water Management Institute,
accessed December 6, 2020.
Dalbaeva, “End the Weaponisation.”
23
Nick Megoran, “Rethinking the Study of
International Boundaries: A Biography of the
Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Boundary,” Annals of
the Association of American Geographers 102,
no. 2 (2012): 471, accessed May 31, 2019,
doi.org/10.1080/00045608.2011.595969.
24
Nick Megoran, “The Critical Geopolitics of
the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley
Border Dispute, 1999-2000,” Political
Geography 23, no. 6 (2004): 733, accessed May
31, 2019, doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2004.03.004.
25
Megoran, “Rethinking the Study,” 470.
26
Ibid, 469.
27
Ibid, 470.
28
Evelyne Heyer, et al., “Genetic diversity and
the emergence of ethnic groups in Central Asia,”
BMC Genetics 10 (2009).
22

Heyer, et al., “Genetic diversity.”
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica,
“Central Asia,” Encyclopaedia Britannica,
December 28, 2018,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-Asia.
29
30

40

Sanderson, “From the Ferghana.”

Megoran, “Rethinking the Study,” 473.
Ibid, 474.
43
Ibid, 474.
44
Ibid, 475.
45
Richard Weitz, “Kyrgyzstan and the Afghan
Campaign’s Logistical Challenges,” Second Line
Defense, last modified November 16, 2011,
https://sldinfo.com/2011/11/kyrgyzstan-andthe-afghan-campaigns-logisticalchallenges/.
46
Weitz, “Kyrgyzstan and the Afghan.”
47
Ibid,.
48
Megoran, “Rethinking the Study,” 476.
49
Nick Megoran, “The Critical Geopolitics of
Danger in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan,”
Environment and Planning D: Society and
Space 23, no. 4 (2005): 573, accessed May 31,
2019.
50
Megoran, “The Critical Geopolitics of
Danger,” 555.
51
Megoran, “Rethinking the Study,” 473-74.
41
42

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2021
46
https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol4/iss1/1

46

et al.: Volume 4, Issue 1

Reforming the
Unreformable: The
Peace Corps,
Neocolonialism, and the
White Savior Complex
LILLY W. WILCOX

Abstract
The Peace Corps has existed since the
1960s, and its goals – “to help the people of
interested countries in meeting their need for
trained men and women, to help promote a
better understanding of Americans on the
part of the peoples served, and to help
promote a better understanding of other
peoples on the part of Americans” – have
remained unchanged since that time.
Because the United States’ government
determines the funding of the organization,
the Peace Corps cannot be fully independent
of the country’s foreign policy. It must be
examined critically to ensure that the work
of the Peace Corps is ethical, as it is an
extension of American soft power. This
paper draws upon previous research about
the history of the Peace Corps as well as the
theories of neocolonialism and the white
savior complex to argue that the
organization needs serious reform. Using the
framework of transformative justice, this
paper recommends different ways in which
the organization must be reformed to
divorce itself from its neocolonialist legacy.
The organization currently prioritizes
surface-level change in host communities. If
the Peace Corps’ ultimate aim is to create
global equity, it must first make structural
changes to its funding and leadership models

and introduce the white savior complex and
sustainable allyship into the training
curriculum for its volunteers.
The Peace Corps Cross-Cultural
Workbook tells many stories of Peace Corps
volunteers who overcome prejudice and
discomfort to fulfill their obligations to their
host communities and learn about
themselves, actualizing Peace Corps founder
John F. Kennedy’s dream of the American
frontiersman.1 However, one story in the
workbook stands out because it does the
opposite. An unnamed Peace Corps
volunteer who worked in Guatemala details
how much he struggled in his role in the
community. He was mocked by local kids
who constantly called him ugly, no one
attended the meetings he organized about
farming techniques, and trees he planted for
the community were intentionally uprooted.2
While this story is presented in the
workbook to remind volunteers that working
in another culture can be a challenge, it also
undermines the idea that the Peace Corps is
effective. If a volunteer can be so
unwelcome in their host community, it
seems obvious that the Peace Corps needs
changing.
The Peace Corps is an integral thread
in the fabric of American foreign policy.3 As
criticism of the U.S. military for excess
intervention in foreign countries becomes
more mainstream, it is important to look at
the Peace Corps with a similarly critical
lens. While the Peace Corps is a largely
well-liked organization domestically, their
mission of uplifting so-called developing
countries can be interpreted as unnecessary,
unwanted, and harmful. There are many
negative aspects to aid and development,
which are often overlooked in favor of the
inspirational stories of those who lift
themselves up by the bootstraps with the
helping hand of an American volunteer.4
Development and aid are temporary
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solutions that do not result in meaningful
change because the problems they try to
solve are systemic.
The Peace Corps is an institution that
helped create a system of reliance on the
Global North during the development era of
the 1960s, and it therefore has an obligation
to shift its goals to help dismantle this
system. This paper will explain the theory of
neocolonialism, argue that the Peace Corps
is a neocolonialist institution, and discuss
the systemic and individual reforms that the
Peace Corps should take to divorce itself
from its harsh legacy.
The legacy of colonialism has
created a lasting power imbalance between
formerly colonized countries and their
former colonizers, often represented by the
terms the Global South and Global North.5
Based on the economic categorizations of
the United Nations and the World Bank, the
Global North includes most high-income
countries, and the Global South includes
most low and middle-income countries,
while also accounting for geography.6 This
language represents a dichotomous—and
therefore not totally accurate—picture of
world economies, but the terms are more
appropriate than First/Third World and
Developed/Developing Countries—
distinctions that imply a clear inferiority.
The language of the Global North and
Global South fit this paper best because they
represent the geopolitical dynamic most
respectfully and are founded on the research
of prominent international organizations that
are relevant to discussions of development
and aid. The Global North and Global South
will be used in this paper to describe
colonialist and formerly colonized countries
in general terms.
The empires of the Global North lost
their political grip on territories in the
Global South during the period of
decolonization in the 1950s and 60s.7
Colonialism was an economic boon for the

Global North, imposed through direct
occupation of the Global South, and
decolonization threatened to wreak havoc on
western economies. As former colonies
became independent, colonialist countries
lost capital and sought new ways to control
the Global South.8 Looking for a solution to
these ails, former colonialist countries
adopted the practice of neocolonialism,
which used economic and cultural means to
control formerly colonized countries.9
Neocolonialism’s roots in culture
and the economy allows it to masquerade as
a positive practice that leads to development
in the Global South and equity with the
Global North. This phenomenon is described
by French Philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre,
who originally coined the term and the idea
of the “neocolonialist mystification.” In his
1956 essay “Colonialism is a System,”
Sartre argues that neocolonialists are those
who have a positive perspective of the
colonialist system as a whole, viewing
themselves as messiahs. These
neocolonialists blame the failure of the
colonial system on a select few illintentioned colonists.10 Based on his critique
of French colonialism in Algeria in this text,
Sartre outlines several key features of
colonialism.11
First, colonialism is an explicitly
capitalist system, designed to benefit only
the colonists. The ultimate goal of the
colonial system is not to create new industry
in colonized lands; the goal is to enable
colonists to take advantage of the land and
the existing industry to benefit their home
country.12 Algeria had a thriving agriculture
industry that sustained the country’s
population before the French occupation.
The focus of the French agriculture industry
in Algeria was the exportation of goods back
to France to make a profit.13 The French
forced Algerians to less fertile lands in the
south and overtook their fertile lands in the
North. In the northern lands, the French
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developed wine grape crops and overtook
the grain market. These crops had no use to
the Algerians because it was against their
faith to drink wine. While French colonists
exported their products back to France,
Algerians starved as their grain crop
diminished in the south and they were
forced to work for the French to survive.14
Additionally, the colonial system
disempowers workers. During the industrial
era, modern technology was accessible to
French colonists in Algeria, and employing
machines was cheaper than employing
Algerians. Algerians were already
impoverished by the French system and
could not benefit from the technological
advancements of the modern era themselves.
The final act of the colonial system, after the
occupation of native land and exploitation of
the worker, is the complete redundancy of
the worker.15
Sartre also touches upon the
imposition of culture as a tool of
colonialism. Language and education are
tools of empowerment, and the French
outlawed the use of Arabic in Algeria to
oppress the Algerian people. In 1956, 80
percent of Algerians were illiterate after
France made French the primary language of
Algeria.16 Additionally, the French pushed
their values of individualism onto the
Algerian population, undermining the
country’s original collective living system.17
Colonialism assumes a hierarchy of both
knowledge and values that places the
colonist on top without considering those
who are colonized.
The colonial system relies upon the
exploitation of the colonized to benefit the
colonist. The neocolonialist who believes
that the colonial system can be reformed is
wholly incorrect because injustice is
inherent to colonialism.18 Sartre argues that
there are three potential outcomes to any
attempt at reform: the reforms will benefit
the colonists and not the colonized people,

the colonialist government will deceptively
undermine the reforms, or the colonialist
government will patently undermine the
reforms.
To explain the first outcome, Sartre
brings up the potential irrigation of the lessfertile, southern lands left to the Algerians.
Ultimately, this would benefit the French
because French law in Algeria stated that
colonists had the right to three-quarters of
irrigated land. This conundrum proves that
exploitation is built into the system. The
second outcome manifested when the
government required that French colonists
return small portions of their land to be
mortgaged to Algerians to repay the State
for the added benefit of irrigation. Rather
than enacting aggressive reforms that
actually helped Algerians, the government
opted to keep themselves in control of land
redistribution so not to hurt the colonists. To
prove his third point, Sartre references
French elections in Algeria, which were
openly corrupt to benefit the French.19
While Sartre’s “Colonialism is a
System” focuses explicitly on colonialism,
rather than neocolonialism, the two systems
have a similar focus—economic and cultural
control. Colonialism emphasizes direct
exploitation of labor and land, and
neocolonialism depends upon the grooming
of economies and value systems of other
countries to serve the Global North.20 While
colonialism is clearly an oppressive system,
it is harder to see the negative effects of the
reformed system due to the neocolonialist
mystification.
Neocolonialism allows colonized
states more autonomy, but, as Sartre argues,
only those who have been colonized truly
understand how to counteract the negative
effects of the colonial system.21 An example
of this dynamic can be found in the map of
development aid distributed by the World
Bank. The distribution of aid is concentrated
in many countries that were formerly under
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a colonial regime, which have had to rely
upon the assistance of the global hegemony
following decolonization.22 Formerly
colonized countries need aid to repair their
countries from the harms of colonialism, but
that necessary reliance fuels neocolonialist
attitudes. Neocolonialist countries do not
fully cede power to formerly colonized
countries, and the same assumed hierarchy
of values remains in place.23 That harmful
hierarchy is evident in the development
projects that were established during the
period of neocolonialism in the mid-20th
century and still last today.
Historically, the first two outcomes
of ineffectual reform—benefit to the
colonist rather than the colonized and
deceptive undermining of reforms by the
colonialist government—have befallen the
Peace Corps. Its foundational motivation
was to win the Cold War, while
masquerading as an altruistic organization
that heralded “modernization” in the
countries in which it intervened.24 The Peace
Corps was founded following the collapse of
traditional colonialism, but its failings
reflect the outcomes that Sartre cautioned of
colonialism.
The Peace Corps is one such
development project that has lasted into the
21st century and is considered as an
organization of the highest caliber.25
Nevertheless, it is still marked by its
neocolonialist history, and the remnants of
its nationalistic beginnings still shape its
modern mission. Some have argued that the
United States cannot be considered a
neocolonialist country because it did not
traditionally hold colonies; however, other
countries do have an economic and cultural
dependence on the United States, fulfilling
the criteria for neocolonialism.26 It is not
necessary for one country to have a history
of colonialism to subsequently become a
neocolonialist country.

In his essay, Neo-colonialism: The
Last Stage of Imperialism, former President
of Ghana Kwame Nkrumah defines
neocolonialism as the subjugation of one
country by another through either
“economic or monetary means” or “through
culture, politics, ideology, literature and
education.”27 Nkrumah critiqued the United
States as a neocolonialist country heavily in
this essay, arguing that traditional foreign
policy organizations were supplemented by
international aid organizations like the Peace
Corps.28 Nkrumah described the Peace
Corps as a “new instrument to cover the
ideological arena,” of the United States’
“plan for invading the so-called Third
World.”29 Nkrumah, who is considered one
of the foremost scholars of neocolonialism,
designated the United States as a
neocolonialist country in spite of the fact
that it never traditionally held colonies and
included the Peace Corps in his critique.
The Kennedy administration founded
the Peace Corps during the Cold War in
1961 as a tool urgently needed to combat the
spread of communism and bring more
countries into the United States’ fold.30 As
Kennedy administration officials
brainstormed how to create an organization
of such scale and importance, Warren
Wiggins, a State Department official, turned
to John F. Kennedy’s own words from his
1961 State of the Union speech. Speaking of
the United States, Kennedy argued:
Our role is essential and unavoidable
in the construction of a sound and
expanding economy for the entire
non-communist world...the problems
in achieving this goal are towering
and unprecedented—the response
must be towering and unprecedented
as well.31
This quote was the backbone of
Warren Wiggin’s memo, “A Towering
Task,” which became the founding
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document of the Peace Corps, illustrating
that the motivation for founding the Peace
Corps was hardly altruistic. Instead, foreign
policy and economics were driving factors,
which allowed neocolonialism to shape the
organization.
Modernization theory of the 1960s
justified the Peace Corps’ development
work as altruistic assistance that would bring
so-called developing countries into the 20th
century, giving the organization an excuse to
intervene in the Global South for the United
States’ benefit. Modernization promised
economic parity with the superpowers of the
Global North, albeit under the watchful eye
of the United States. Gendered language
permeated the Peace Corps’ arguments for
modernization. Developing countries were
marked either as the “little brother” waiting
to be taken under the wing of the United
States, or as shamefully effeminate, needing
the masculine United States to bring them
into the capitalist brotherhood of the West.32
The United States used the seductive idea of
development to convince other countries
that American involvement in their affairs
was the best way forward, embodying the
same principles of the neocolonialist
mystification. Modernization theory
presented the United States with an
alternative to traditional colonialism, which
allowed the United States to become a
global superpower through social control of
developing countries.33
The rhetoric of American masculine
stewardship pushed by modernization theory
was rampant in the fight against the Cold
War and is best represented by the debate
about the concept of domestic containment.
President Nixon argued that domestic
containment, the idea that embracing rigid
gender roles, the nuclear family, and
traditional American values, would propel
the fight against the Soviets in the Cold
War.34 In his presidential campaign against
Nixon, Kennedy strongly rejected the

domestic containment ideal and campaigned
upon the fear that the United States was
losing its masculine ruggedness, a quality
that the Soviets wholeheartedly embraced.
Kennedy’s establishment of the Peace Corps
was an attempt to remedy the growing
American “softness,” which he thought
would cost the country the Cold War.35 The
motivations for the foundation of the Peace
Corps were to benefit the American
volunteer more than their host country,
embodying the same principle that Sartre
argues is the outcome of failed colonial
reform.36 Peace Corps host countries became
the playgrounds at which 20-somethingyear-old American men could embrace their
masculinity through physical labor and
leadership, while lifting up their host
countries into the American capitalist
brotherhood.37
Entry into this brotherhood was
contingent on the adoption of American
values by host countries. The economic
structure of the Peace Corps embodied the
idea of individualism, and the Kennedy
administration used the person-to-person
development work of the Peace Corps to
push this value onto host countries. If the
foremost goal of the Peace Corps was the
economic development of host countries, the
organization would have been a tool to
redistribute the United States wealth
equitably. Instead, the organization was
shaped around volunteers doing
development work for their own betterment.
Person-to-person work sent the message that
economic growth started on an individual
level and did not recognize the structural
inequality of the world economy shaped by
centuries of colonialism.38
This individualistic practice
prevented the Peace Corps from making
significant changes in the communities
volunteers entered. Nanda Shrestha, who
wrote about his experience with the Peace
Corps when they came to his Nepali village
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in 1962, describes that he felt “bewitched”
by the new Peace Corps school, which was
nicer than any classroom he had ever seen.
Nevertheless, Shrestha returned home to
hunger and poverty. Because of the stark
contrast, “Poverty had rarely been so
frightening, or so degrading, in the past.”39
Volunteers who worked in the school in
Shrestha’s village did not have the systemic
understanding of problems that would have
allowed them to help the whole community.
Issues were treated individually, which led
to further degradation in communities that
did not have the tools they needed to create
holistic change. These misconceptions of
modernization theory and the organization’s
Cold War roots allowed neocolonialist
practices to become the center of the
organization. The early Peace Corps was
both a publicity stunt and a foreign policy
tool for the United States.
The Peace Corps has three specific
goals that have not changed since its
founding in 1961. The first goal is “to help
the people of interested countries in meeting
their need for skilled individuals.”40 This
goal, although paternalistic, made sense
during decolonization in the 1960s. Many
countries did not have well-established
university systems following the end of
colonial rule, and Peace Corps volunteers
could provide support in fields that required
additional training. However, this is no
longer the case. Now, most Peace Corps
host countries have university systems, yet
jobs that could be done by host country
nationals are still filled by Peace Corps
volunteers.41 In the current system, only
United States citizens can serve as Peace
Corps volunteers, further limiting options
for host country nationals who could
perform skilled work.42 Karen Rothmyer,
who served as a Peace Corps volunteer in
Kenya, outlines the problem. Following her
Peace Corps volunteer experience, she went
on to teach at the well-established

University of Nairobi, where she found that
university graduates struggled to get jobs,
while Peace Corps volunteer positions were
constantly filled.43 One of the main
principles of colonialism, argued by Sartre,
is the disempowerment of the native
worker.44 The Peace Corps delegitimizes the
skill of citizens of host countries and
prevents sustainable development by
continually placing Americans in the roles
of Peace Corps volunteers.
The second goal is “to promote a
better understanding of Americans on the
part of the peoples served.”45 When looking
at the motivations for the founding of the
Peace Corps, this goal is more harmful than
it seems. This goal ties back to the early
motivations of the Peace Corps, which
hoped that interpersonal relationships with
Americans would strengthen Cold War
allegiances to the U.S. Now this goal
perpetuates neocolonialism in a more
discreet way. Americans disrupt the cultural
stability of their host communities. Through
their work as Peace Corps volunteers,
Americans become associated with wealth
and education, solidifying the hierarchy of
values that is central to neocolonialism.
Finally, the Peace Corps hopes “to
promote a better understanding of other
peoples on the part of Americans.”46 This
goal shows that Americans, and Peace Corps
volunteers by proxy, tend to think of other
cultures as different and underdeveloped.
The placement of Americans in the role of
educators working to lift host country
citizens out of poverty is a manifestation of
the idea of the white savior complex.47
The white savior complex is the view
of citizens of the Global North as
themselves as a messiah for the Global
South as they embark on “voluntourism”
trips.48 This perspective is rooted in
colonialism, which began the common
portrayal of the Global South as inferior to
the Global North.49 “Voluntourists” partake
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in overseas charity work often for selfish
purposes and without considering the true
effects of their actions, effectively
supporting the neocolonialist system.50
While voluntourism is often used to describe
short-term work or missionary efforts,
humanitarian aid and development also
encounter similar problems relating to the
motivations and outcomes of their work. By
nature, they perpetuate the white savior
complex because they depend on the
paternalistic good will of the Global North
towards the Global South.51
The white savior complex is evident
in the testimonials of Peace Corps
volunteers—66% of whom are not
minorities—and example perspectives
written by the organization itself found in
the Peace Corps’ pre-departure workbook.52
One volunteer who worked in Turkey
describes how his experience was tainted by
local conventions, which he found were not
“natural and logical.”53 While the Peace
Corps workbook points out these
perceptions to combat them, the idea that
other cultures are different is ingrained in
the third goal of the Peace Corps.
The second and third goals are
positive in intent, but not necessarily in
impact. The organization hopes to break
down cultural barriers by sending American
volunteers into foreign countries. This
would work if the Peace Corps was a
volunteer exchange. Because it is not, it
perpetuates the idea that host country
nationals cannot do worthwhile work in the
U.S. and allows the American volunteers to
fill the role of the white savior.
Currently, volunteers apply to work
in one of six sectors for the Peace Corps—
agriculture, community and economic
development, environment, health, youth in
development, and education.54 Agriculture
volunteers work with host country citizens
to teach farmers sustainable farming
techniques with an emphasis on climate

change and conservation, as well as food
and nutrition education.55 Volunteers who
work in the community economic
development sector teach entrepreneurship
and business best practices to host country
locals, often working with other
development organizations and NGOs.
Environment volunteers teach about climate
change and sustainability in host
communities.56 The health sector focuses on
HIV/AIDS prevention and education, as
well as hygiene, water sanitation, nutrition,
and maternal and child health.57 In Youth in
Development, volunteers educate young
people from host communities about social,
health, and environmental issues.58
Finally, in education, the largest
Peace Corps sector, volunteers teach a
variety of subjects in schools of all levels.
There is an emphasis on English language
education, and volunteers can become
certified in Teaching English as a Foreign
Language.59 As Sartre points out,
assimilation through language is a common
tool of neocolonialism, which reinforces the
hierarchy of ideals that values the culture of
the Global North.60 While teaching the
English language is not negative in itself, it
is important to recognize the assumptions
that the program makes about the weight of
one language over another. Volunteers do
learn local languages, but that is out of
necessity for their two-year assignment. In
contrast, the locals learning English is seen
as a necessary tool for modernization.
The language used in the Peace
Corps’ description of these sectors
emphasizes the idea of empowerment.
Volunteers are there to empower host
country communities, an aim that was not
present in early Peace Corps
documentation.61 Through language, the
organization subtly recognizes its past
failings. If empowerment had always been
the goal of the organization, the organization
would no longer be necessary. Despite this
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turn in language, the organization still has
not escaped its paternalistic past, and some
volunteers still harbor this attitude. Common
issues that Peace Corps volunteers have is
the perception that they know better than the
locals with whom they work.62 The Peace
Corps emphasizes teaching in the language
used to describe volunteers’ roles without
emphasizing the learning they will do. As
Sartre argues, local people know their
communities best—neocolonialism assumes
the opposite.63
By pushing capitalism on developing
countries with the promise of becoming a
member of the U.S. economic brotherhood
and by promoting American ideals through
education and the other sectors of the Peace
Corps, it is clear that the Peace Corps
perpetuates neocolonialism through both the
economic and cultural control of other
countries. The Peace Corps must be
reformed using the theory of transformative
redistribution and recognition to divorce
itself from neocolonialist attitudes and better
serve host countries.
Scholar Nancy Fraser theorizes that
justice can be broken down into calls for
either redistribution of wealth or recognition
of culture.64 Issues of cultural injustice seek
remedies of recognition, the practice of
revaluing particular groups that are
culturally marginalized. Alternatively, the
solution to economic issues is redistribution
of wealth to rid the system of economic
injustice.65 Development and aid are
functions of the liberal welfare state, which
recognizes the need for redistribution and
recognition but attempts to solve immediate
rather than structural issues, embodying the
theory of affirmative redistribution and
recognition. This approach to change means
that development organizations cannot truly
solve the problems they claim to address.
The alternative to affirmative redistribution
and recognition is transformation, which is

more effective because it takes a systemic
approach to combating injustice.
Affirmation is ineffective because it
provides surface-level solutions to problems
rooted in structural inequality, essentially
informing the principles of the liberal
welfare state. It also values the concept of
multiculturalism without acknowledging the
ways in which economic problems prey on
it.66 Wealth is redistributed to those who
have less of it, but the structural reasons
behind the imbalance of wealth is not
examined. Multiculturalism is valued
without understanding the harms that are
produced by emphasizing differences.
Cultural value is ingrained into unjust
economic structures. By maintaining
identity groups, there is room for groups to
be othered, and the root of economic issues
remains untouched. Affirmation creates an
“aid addiction,” through which the Global
North controls developing countries
economically.67 The Peace Corps is a tool
that perpetuates aid addiction in the form of
human capital outsourced from the United
States. The organization continually supplies
host countries with aid and American Peace
Corps volunteers, who are essentially
employed by the United States’ government
and take roles that could be filled with
qualified candidates from host countries.
This furthers the perception that the Global
South is inferior to the Global North, when
it is actually the fault of unjust economic
structures.
The Peace Corps should be reformed
to embrace the theory of transformative
redistribution and recognition.
Transformation is a more serious
restructuring of society, which entails
deconstructing identity dichotomies to
achieve true economic parity.68
Transformation recognizes that sustainable
change cannot happen without restructuring
the economy to rid it of cultural injustice.
The Peace Corps depends on the dichotomy
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of the rich Global North and the poor Global
South to justify its affirmative work. To
create sustainable change in host countries,
the organization should focus on combating
this perception of superiority and focus on
collaboration with its host country partners.
Economic parity cannot exist while the
Peace Corps fuels the aid addiction system.
If the Peace Corps wants to function
as a tool for achieving economic and
cultural equality, its ultimate goal should be
that the organization becomes obsolete. It
should work to redistribute capital in a
sustainable way, rather than attempting to
solve structural economic problems without
changing the structure itself. Actions like
teaching agricultural techniques or business
skills are helpful on a small scale but do not
address the economic inequalities and
cultural hierarchy between the Global North
and Global South that remain from the
colonial era. While this structural inequality
remains, the Peace Corps will continue to
inadvertently other the cultures and
individuals of host countries due to
entrenched perceptions about the Global
South.
The Peace Corps is a function of
neocolonialism and the liberal welfare state
associated with affirmation, and it is
ingrained in the American consciousness, so
it is unlikely it will be completely abolished
anytime soon. Realistically, change to the
system will happen gradually, so the
American public can acclimatize to the idea
of transformation of the Peace Corps. There
are three policies that the Peace Corps must
adopt to divorce itself from the
neocolonialist system.
The Peace Corps could do significant
good by redistributing the country’s wealth
with the resources of the United States’
government at hand. As of 2010, estimates
show that even a 2% redistribution of wealth
could eliminate extreme poverty.69
However, organizations like the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank, which were created to address
economic inequality, fund foreign
governments with the expectation that they
adopt neoliberal economic policies, while
fueling their aid addiction and preventing
true global equity.70 If the Peace Corps
pivots to redistributing wealth to other
governments, it will likely fall into the same
pattern of promoting aid addiction by
providing conditional loans like the IMF and
the World Bank, rather than how it does
now through the practice of sending
volunteers. It would not be able to avoid the
critiques of capitalism while under the
charge of the United States government. In
order to radically rethink redistribution, the
focus of the Peace Corps should first be
transformative recognition. By confronting
its neocolonialist past and altering its
organizational structure to become more
collaborative, the Peace Corps will be better
equipped to supply monetary aid and
volunteers to host countries in ways dictated
by host countries. As Sartre argues, only
formerly colonized countries—not formerly
colonial countries—can undo the damage
done to their countries by colonialism.71
The Peace Corps insists that it is an
independent agency that does not carry out
the foreign policy goals of Congress or the
White House, but critics acknowledge that it
is in fact a form of American soft power.72 It
does not function like a traditional foreign
policy tool because it is collaborative in
some ways with foreign governments—host
countries must agree to be a part of the
program. However, the goals of the Peace
Corps show that it is an attempt to promote a
positive image of the United States,
bolstering traditional foreign policy
objectives through public relations. While
the American government does not write the
organization’s goals, its financial capacity
for good is regulated by the budget set by
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the federal government, and therefore it is
not fully independent.73
Many critics argue that the Peace
Corps should transition to a mixed funding
model in which it would be partially
government-funded, and partially funded
through private grants and donations.74 In
this scenario, the federal government would
still have a financial stake in the Peace
Corps, and the agency still would face the
dilemma of—at best—reflecting or—at
worst—carrying out American foreign
policy. Complete privatization is also an
untenable solution. If the Peace Corps was
in the hands of private American citizens,
the issue of cultural misrecognition would
likely go unaddressed. The worst outcome
of privatization would lead the Peace Corps
further down the damaging path towards the
white savior complex or cause it to become
more similar to damaging missionary
organizations. The best outcome would see
it still solely in the hands of the American
people who alone cannot rectify the
organization’s past or their own
misconceptions about host countries. If the
Peace Corps becomes a private institution, it
will not be able to embrace the structural
change needed to comply with the principles
of transformation.
To solve both the issues of cultural
misrecognition by the Peace Corps and the
issue of its funding, the United States
government and the governments of host
nations should work collaboratively, similar
to the structure of the Fulbright Program.75
As an international institution based on the
principles of partnership and representation,
the Peace Corps will be able to combat
misrecognition and structural inequality
within the organization. While international
institutions can still carry out neocolonial
missions, the checks and balances
established in a cooperative international
institution will help mitigate this. The Peace
Corps should be funded by the government

of the United States and the governments of
participating countries, so that it cannot be
regulated by the foreign policy objectives of
the United States alone. As the organization
functions now, it is unlikely that other
governments would consent to this. Host
countries receive aid from the Peace Corps,
but their citizens do not participate equally
in the organization.
The Peace Corps would benefit from
having host country nationals in Peace
Corps leadership and volunteer positions
within their own country, which would give
host country governments more reason to
back the Peace Corps economically.76 This
would help to solve issues of misrecognition
by the U.S. Peace Corps volunteers and of
the first goal of the Peace Corps, which aims
to supply skilled individuals to Peace Corps
host countries. The language of
empowerment that the Peace Corps uses to
describe their own work should be translated
into real change. The organization should
empower host country locals by putting
them in leadership positions, rather than
relying on the myth of the benevolent
American volunteer who knows best. In this
case, the American volunteer would become
unnecessary, furthering the Peace Corps
towards its own dismantling.
As an agency that works
collaboratively between countries, the Peace
Corps should set up an exchange program
with the ultimate goal of dismantling the
United States’ Americentric mentality.77 The
Peace Corps faces the problem of the white
savior complex; the goals of the
organization allow volunteers to see
themselves as superior to the locals with
whom they work in their host countries. If
cultural exchange becomes the norm,
Americans who volunteer with the Peace
Corps will have a more complete
understanding of cultures other than their
own. Misrecognition can be combated
through familiarity, which will blur the lines
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drawn to distinguish culture and prevent
economic disparity from again taking root
based on cultural prejudices in the fashion of
transformative justice.78
Once the Peace Corps becomes a
collaborative, multinational organization, it
can be reformed in the manner of
transformative redistribution. Armed with
the resources of the United States’
government and the guidance of decolonized
countries, the Peace Corps will be able to
fulfill Sartre’s expectation that formerly
colonized countries dictate their own healing
from the harms of colonialism.79 As an
international organization, the Peace Corps
must work towards transformative
recognition that dismantles the hegemony of
the United States and the Global North.
Effective redistribution must be dictated by
each host country without the threat of
neoliberal capitalism and with any American
volunteers under the supervision of their
host country. Additionally, American
leaders within the partnership of the Peace
Corps must undergo a complete shift in
mindset regarding neocolonialist hierarchy.
The organization’s transformation cannot
afford to be hindered by the backwards
thinking of a few American leaders
mystified by neocolonialism.
Individual actors within the Peace
Corps system, including the leaders who
work collaboratively with host countries,
must be educated on sustainable allyship in
addition to systemic change, so they can
work within the system to create global
equity. For the institution of the Peace Corps
to undergo transformational reform,
American neocolonialist mindsets must be
shifted. International organizations have the
tools to prevent neocolonialism but are not
neocolonial by nature. Without the
cooperation of leaders who have
decolonized their perception of global
politics and economics, neocolonialism

could take hold through the influence of the
countries deemed powerful.
Thorough education on the white
savior complex and sustainable allyship for
American Peace Corps volunteers and
leaders will be essential to ensuring that the
organization can undergo its transformation.
Additionally, because transformation will
not happen overnight, this education will
help prevent issues of cultural
misrecognition by American Peace Corps
volunteers who serve before the
organization is reformed. While the Peace
Corps does conduct three months of training
before Peace Corps volunteers begin their
work, the white savior complex is not
mentioned once in their 266 page
workbook.80 Training emphasizes how to
combat ethnocentrism and practice “cultural
sensitivity,” but the workbook does not
acknowledge how it systemically
perpetuates those problems.81
One way to combat the white savior
complex is to increase training on
sustainable allyship for Peace Corps
volunteers. Effective social justice allies are
“members of dominant social groups who
are working to end the system of oppression
that gives them greater privilege and power
based on their social-group membership.”82
Becoming a social justice ally requires
constant meditation about one’s role in
systems of oppression, and Peace Corps
volunteers who wish to force the hand of the
organization in favor of transformation must
be trained on the statuses of social justice
ally identity development.83 Peace Corps
volunteers must reject the idea of dominant
cultures and use their privilege to work with
oppressed groups to dismantle the system,
achieving autonomy status as a social justice
ally.84
To combat the harms of the white
savior complex and voluntourism, Peace
Corps volunteers and leaders must work
towards being an ally for social justice
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rather than for self-interest or altruism. The
white savior mentality is a key part of both
self-interest and altruism-motivated allyship.
Those who are motivated by self-interest
have a sense of pride in their work that
prevents them from seeing systemic
oppression and view themselves as a savior
due to the work they are doing.85 While
those who are motivated by altruism have
little more awareness of systems of
oppression, they understand how it functions
without recognizing their role in it. Their
guilt about systems of oppression manifests
in their attempt to be a hero, treating the
oppressed paternalistically.86
Allies for social justice work
collaboratively with the oppressed group
and are held accountable by those with
whom they work. They understand the ways
they benefit from the systems of oppression
and understand that dismantling the systems
is also an act of self-liberation, in
accordance with the principles of
transformative justice.87 Peace Corps
volunteers and leaders who embody the
practice of social justice allyship will be
essential to the transformative recognition
and redistribution that the Peace Corps must
undergo.
The question then remains, are
current and aspiring Peace Corps volunteers
perpetuating the harms of neocolonialism
themselves? While they have a hand in the
system, they do not control the system.
Sartre writes, “I do not consider as colonists
either the minor public officials or the
European workers who are at the same time
innocent victims and beneficiaries of the
system.”88 In this scenario, Peace Corps
volunteers are comparable to the minor
public officials or European workers, who
have only ever known the system.
The Peace Corps has been touted as
a noble way to demonstrate patriotism, gain
global cultural experience, and serve others
since its founding in 1961. As it stands, the

Peace Corps has a good reputation, and in
the 21st century it has changed very little.
The Brookings Institution published their
first critique of the Peace Corps in 2003, and
yet the most recent article, written in 2017,
called for much of the same reforms.89 To
reform the Peace Corps and dismantle the
economic and cultural systems of oppression
that it perpetuates, there will need to be
leaders from within the system, acting as
social justice allies with a vested interest in
the organization. Current and aspiring Peace
Corps volunteers must differentiate
themselves from colonists by calling for
change because of their knowledge of the
system.
There is hope for the Peace Corps
yet, and that charge must be taken up by
those who do care for a globalist future set
on equitable terms. While the Peace Corps’
legacy may be rooted in neocolonialism and
the white savior complex, it has the capacity
to lead the charge against those maladies
through its reform. The Peace Corps must
not be an American institution, but rather an
international institution, which will be held
accountable by its formerly colonized
partners and rebuilt on the principles of
international cooperation. American leaders
and volunteers in this institution must be
educated on sustainable allyship to ensure
that the Peace Corps does not fall into the
same pattern of neocolonialism regardless of
its new international status.
The organization should be a tool for
the redistribution of the wealth of the United
States into the hands of host country
communities, rather than the inefficient
practice of person-to-person development.
Host country locals should be placed in
Peace Corps volunteer and leadership
positions, as host countries do not lack in socalled skilled volunteers. The organization
should send volunteers from host countries
to the United States to dismantle the
perception that the Global South must rely
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on the Global North for survival. As such,
the organization should be funded by both
the United States and host countries to
separate the organization from the sway of
foreign policy. The Peace Corps can have a
part to play in the dismantling of the harmful
legacy of neocolonialism.
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